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Thomas J. Philbrick

ROBERT BRACE AND THE SHIFTING SANDS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
ABSTRACT
Pennsylvania farmer Robert Brace was sued by the
federal government in 1987 for repairs he made to an existing
drainage system on his farm. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held in 1994 that Brace’s repair activities did not constitute
“normal farming activity” and were therefore subject to Clean
Water Act regulation. After thirty years of contending with the
government, Brace has now filed an $8 million administrative
action against the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army
Corps of Engineers, and the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service requesting financial compensation for improper
regulatory enforcement that has resulted in millions of dollars of
lost profits.
Mr. Brace should prevail in this lawsuit because he was
wrongfully accused of violating federal regulations from which he
was in compliance or exempt. Furthermore, to ensure that other
farmers are not subjected to such a fate, structural changes must
be made to the United States’ environmental and agricultural
regulatory systems. These changes include redefining “normal
farming activities” under the Clean Water Act to reflect a more
realistic understanding of agriculture, reinforcing the original
definition of Prior Converted Cropland to definitively exclude
croplands converted prior to 1985 from Clean Water Act
jurisdiction, and definitively recognizing the Commenced
Conversion exemptions from Clean Water Act regulation given to
farmers like Robert Brace.
The Robert Brace case is a poignant reminder that failing
to restrain regulatory overreach seriously threatens America’s
farmers. Agricultural and environmental interests must be
balanced by policymakers and citizens alike, but regulatory
frameworks divorced from the realities of farming are unhelpful
on many levels. The story of Robert Brace shows that the shifting
sands of the administrative state can pose a grave threat to
individual freedoms if allowed to roam unchecked.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On a cool morning in May 1987, twelve officials from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”), and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) pulled into the driveway
of farmer Robert Brace in Waterford Township, Pennsylvania.1 In a conversation
that would drastically alter the course of Brace’s life, the officials told him that he
was violating section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and ordered him to stop
all discharge activities on one of three adjacent tracts of his mixed-use farm or pay a
$50,000-per-day penalty.2 The alleged discharge activities were the ditch
maintenance actions Brace had taken from 1977 to 1984 to repair a field drainage
system built by his grandfather.3 The repairs were necessitated in large part by the
recurring presence of several beaver dams within the ditch network. While the
Pennsylvania Game Commission (“PGC”) had removed the beavers on a previous
occasion without issue,4 one of the PGC agents subsequently began questioning
Brace about the repairs he had made to the drainage system.5Soon afterward, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sued Brace.6
Thirty years later, Brace is still battling the government.7 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held in 1994 that Brace’s repair activities were not “normal farming
activities” and were, therefore, subject to CWA regulation.8 With no options left,
Brace signed a consent decree in 1996 that required him to restore his approximately
30-acre tract to pre-1985 conditions.9 However, the parties had different conceptions
of what the pre-1985 condition of the tract had been.10 After a series of contradictory
notices to Brace regarding whether he could use the land, the EPA filed two lawsuits
against him in January 2017 for CWA violations on two portions of his property.11

1. Chris Bennett, Blood And Dirt: A Farmer’s 30-Year Fight With the Feds, AGWEB (May 16, 2018,
7:43 AM), https://www.agweb.com/article/blood-and-dirt-a-farmers-30-year-fight-with-the-feds/.
2. Id.
3. See Defendants’ Response and Opposition to United States Second Motion to Enforce Consent
Decree and For Stipulated Penalties at 5, United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 (W.D. Pa. 2018)
[hereinafter Response] (noting that Brace’s grandfather had used the drainage system years earlier); see
generally 2-6-19 Order & 3-26-19 Order, United States v. Brace, Civil Action 90-299 (W.D. Pa. 1996).
The author wishes to note that these Orders established that the Response cited previously in this footnote
is currently being held in abeyance for redrafting and refiling. The document is historically archived and
is valid public domain material.
4. See Bennett, supra note 1.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See generally United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 1:17cv6 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
8. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1994).
9. See Consent Decree at 3, United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-299 (W.D. Pa. 1996)
(“Defendants will perform wetlands restoration in accordance with the wetlands restoration plan.”).
10. See Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 344 (2006) (“[B]y the end of 1979, the site was dry,
with the exception of times of excessive rainfall.”); see also “”EcoStrategies Civil Eng’g, Wetland
Evaluation Report, 4, (2015), http://nebula.wsimg.com/658771222d0cf5edb63033181395d3a6?
AccessKeyId=7F494AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 [hereinafter Report] (stating
that the “pre-1984 condition was dry farmland that was properly drained and either producing crops or
was in the process of being converted to produce crops as shown on the authentic historical aerial photos”).
11. See infra Part II.B; see also United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 1:17cv6 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
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In June of that year, the case took a favorable turn for Brace when a Western District
of Pennsylvania judge agreed to authorize additional discovery in the initial 1990
case.12 Brace then filed an $8 million administrative action against the EPA, Corps,
and FWS under the Federal Tort Claims Act.13 In this action, Brace requested
financial compensation for twenty years of damage to his family farming business,
harm to his land, and improper regulatory enforcement that resulted in millions of
dollars of lost profits.14
Brace was wrongfully accused of violating federal regulations with which
he was in compliance or exempt from.15 Several structural changes must be made to
the United States’ regulatory framework in order to ensure that other farmers are not
subjected to circumstances like those of Robert Brace.16 These changes include
redefining the CWA’s “normal farming activities” exemption to reflect a more
realistic understanding of agriculture, reinforcing the original definition of Prior
Converted Cropland to exclude croplands converted prior to 1985 from CWA
jurisdiction, and definitively recognizing the Commenced Conversion exemptions
from CWA regulation given to farmers like Robert Brace.17
In Part I, this Note discusses the background of the Brace family farm
lawsuit.18 This Part includes the legal framework for the lawsuit, the factual and
procedural history of the case, and an introduction to the broader policy debate.19
Part II argues that Brace should prevail in this lawsuit because he was wrongfully
accused of violating the federal statutes and regulations at issue.20 Part III proposes
three policy changes that Congress should adopt in light of the Brace lawsuit to better
protect farmers from regulatory overreach.21
II. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE BRACE FAMILY
FARM
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which regulates the use of the nation’s
waterways, is the primary statute at issue in the Brace case.22 It intersects with the
12. See Bennett, supra note 1.
13. See Federal Torts Claims Act at 1, Brace v. United States, Civil Action No. 90-229 (W.D. Pa.
2017) [hereinafter Torts Claim].
14. See id.; see also Lawrence Kogan, 30-Year-Old Wetlands Case Takes Favorable Turn for
Aggrieved Pennsylvania Farmer, THE KOGAN LAW GRP., P.C., (July 12, 2017),
https://www.pr.com/press-release/723108.
15. See infra Part II (arguing that Robert Brace should prevail because he was falsely accused of
violating federal regulations with which he was in compliance or exempt from).
16. See infra Part III (arguing that Congress must address three policy issues in order to prevent other
farmers from experiencing the same struggles as Robert Brace).
17. See id.
18. See infra Part I (describing the legal and factual background of the Brace family farm lawsuit).
19. See id.
20. See infra Part II (arguing that Robert Brace should prevail because he was falsely accused of
violating federal regulations with which he was in compliance or exempt from).
21. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A)-(C) (2012) (noting that the current definition of normal farming
activities includes planting, seeding, harvesting, cultivation, minor drainage, upland soil and water
conservation practices, emergency repairs, maintaining drainage and tiling systems, and maintaining
drainage ditches); see also infra Part III.
22. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
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Food Security Act of 1985 (“FSA”), which includes exemptions from regulation
under the CWA and additional wetlands regulations.23 These two statutes and their
accompanying regulations create a complex administrative structure.24 The
government used these two statutes to charge Robert Brace with violations of federal
law.25
A. The Clean Water Act and Its Progeny
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants from any point source into
navigable waters of the United States (“WOTUS”) without a permit.26 The EPA
enforces the CWA in consultation with the FWS and the Corps.27 The Obama
administration redefined WOTUS so that all wetlands adjacent to WOTUS became
subject to the CWA permitting requirements.28 Whether a body of water is a WOTUS
subject to CWA regulation is determined by whether the water has a significant
nexus to a navigable water.29 The Trump administration proposed a revised
definition of WOTUS on December 11, 2018 and subsequently issued a final revised
rule on January 23, 2020.30
23. See id.; see Food Security Act of 1985, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3822 (2012). The CWA and FSA
intersect in several ways. For instance, the FSA’s “Swampbuster” provision, which is discussed in depth
below, partners with the CWA to prevent wetlands from being drained without proper consideration of
other factors.
24. See Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs: Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,031-45,035
(Aug. 25, 1993) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323, 328) [hereinafter Final Rule] (“[W]e are excluding
PC crop land from the definition of the waters of U.S. in order to achieve consistency in the manner in
which various federal programs address wetlands.”).
25. See generally Complaint, United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
27. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
28. See Sarah Everhart, The WOTUS Rule Applies in Maryland, MD. RISK MGMT. EDUC. BLOG (Sept
18, 2018), http://agrisk.umd.edu/blog/the-wotus-rule-applies-in-maryland?utm_source=feedburner
&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+MarylandAgriculturalLawBlog+%28Maryland+Risk
+Management+Blog%29; see also Lawrence A. Kogan, US Food Security and Farmers’ Livelihoods at
Stake in “Waters of the US” Rule Rewrite, THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (Apr 20, 2017),
https://www.wlf.org/2017/04/20/wlf-legal-pulse/us-food-security-and-farmers-livelihoods-at-stake-inwaters-of-the-us-rule-rewrite/.
29. See Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the
requisite nexus of a wetland is met if the wetlands alone or in combination with similiarly situated lands
in the region, “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of a navigable water);
see also Brandon C. Smith, Note, Jurisdictional Donnybrook: Deciphering Wetlands Jurisdiction After
Rapanos, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 337, 340-41 (2007) (arguing that the significant nexus standard leads to
“disparate outcomes and uncertainty” for private property owners).
30. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154 (February 14, 2019)
(to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328) [hereinafter Revised Definition];
see also Envtl. Protection Agency, FACT SHEET, PROPOSED REVISED DEFINITION OF “WATERS
OF THE UNITED STATES”, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-12/documents/factsheet__wotus_revision_overview_12.10_1.pdf (Th[e] longstanding exclusion for [prior converted cropland]
would be continued under the proposal, and the agencies are clarifying that this exclusion would cease to
apply when cropland is abandoned (i.e., not used for, or in support of, agricultural purposes in the
preceding five years) and has reverted to wetlands.”); see also The Navigable Waters Protection Rule:
Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 85 Fed. Reg. 22, 251 (April 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33
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Significant ambiguity exists regarding exactly what triggers the CWA
permitting requirements.31 However, one source of certainty comes from § 404 of
the CWA, which creates an exception to the requirements.32 This section states that
discharges associated with “normal farming activities,” such as growing crops,
cultivating the soil, and maintaining drainage ditches, are exempt from the CWA
permitting requirements.33 Regulatory Guidance Letter 07-02 further defined the
maintenance of drainage ditches to include necessary excavation, erosion
management, and repair or replacement of existing structures to preserve the ditch’s
working condition.34
Congress created the § 404 normal farming activities exemption in order to
avoid imposing undue burdens on farmers.35 Many of the statements made during
the 1972 CWA amendment hearings reflect this intent.36 For instance, Assistant
Secretary of Army for Civil Works Victor Veysey noted that the intent behind the
normal farming activities exemption was to ensure “that all the normal things that a
farmer does in the course of his operations are exempted.”37 National Farm Bureau’s
Bruce Hawley stated that normal farming activities included things like repairing
drainage, laying new tiles, and managing water flow for farming purposes.38 Maine
Senator Edmund Muskie explicitly stated that permits were not required for draining
C.F.R. pt. 328) [hereinafter New Rule] (laying out four categories of waters that are considered “waters
of the United States”: “the territorial seas, and waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including waters which are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide; tributaries; lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and
adjacent wetlands”).
31. See William Pufko, The Revised Definition of “Discharge of Dredged Material”: It’s Legality,
Practicality, and Impact on Wetlands Protection, 9 ENVTL. L. 187, 197-98 (2002) (“A review of the
legislative history concerning Congress’s understanding of what constituted a ‘discharge of dredged
material’ reveals little as to the potential activities that Congress envisioned would trigger the section 404
permit requirement.”).
32. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (2012).
33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A), (f)(1)(C) (2012) (describing normal farming as “plowing, seeding,
cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland
soil and water conservation practices”).
34. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, No. 07-02, REGULATORY GUIDANCE LETTER,
SUBJECT: EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION OR MAINTENANCE OF IRRIGATION
DITCHES AND MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE DITCHES UNDER SECTION 404 OF CLEAN
WATER ACT, at 4-5 (2007), [hereinafter Regulatory Guidance Letter 07-02]
https://www.nap.usace.army.mil/Portals/39/docs/regulatory/rgls/rgl07-02.pdf (noting that drainage ditch
maintenance includes “activities such as [e]xcavation of accumulated sediments back to original
contours[, r]e-shaping of the side slopes[, b]ank stabilization to prevent erosion where reasonably
necessary using best management practices . . . [,] and [r]eplacement of existing control structures, where
the original function is not changed and original approximate capacity is not increased. Maintenance is
generally viewed as involving activities that keep something in its existing state or proper condition or
preserve it from failure or decline.”).
35. See Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Amendments of 1972: Hearings
Before the Committee on Public Works, 94th Cong. 59 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings].
36. Id.
37. Id. (statement of Victor Veysey, Assistant Secretary of Army for Civil Works).
38. Id. at 553 (statement of Bruce Hawley, Assistant Director of National Affairs, National Farm
Bureau) ([“N]ormal farming activity also includes such things as streambank protection, drainage ditches,
construction of new drainage ditches, a laying of new tiles, impounding of waters for the express purpose
of having something for livestock to drink later in the summer, and so on.”).
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poorly drained farmland.39 Other statements made in Congress reflect the widespread
fear of over-regulation that would fail to take into account the realities of everyday
farming activities.40 For example, West Virginia Senator Jennings Randolph noted
the “widespread concern that many [farming] activities that are normally considered
routine would be prohibited or made extremely difficult because of the complex
regulatory procedures.”41 Senator Muskie also felt that the CWA was promulgating
an unrealistic and cumbersome view of agriculture that could substantially
disadvantage farmers.42
In practice, the normal farming activities exemption has been interpreted
quite narrowly by the EPA (or agencies) and courts. The EPA regulations that
accompany the CWA have mirrored this approach.43 They establish that an
agricultural activity is not part of an established farming operation and is therefore
not exempt if it brings a wetland that has not previously been used for farming into
agricultural production.44 If modification of the hydrological regime is required for
the land to become usable, the land is not considered part of an established or
ongoing farming operation.45 Many individuals have voiced concerns that the
definition should include activities like growing hay or grazing animals, regardless
of whether the land requires hydrological changes.46 However, courts have continued
39. See A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977, 1042 (Aug. 4, 1977) (statement of Sen.
Edmund Muskie) (“[T]he drainage exemption is very clearly intended to put to rest, once and for all, the
fears that permits are required for draining poorly drained farm land or forest land. . . . “).
40. See Hearings, supra note 36 at 1-2 (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph, W. Va.).
41. See id. at 1-2.
42. See David Porter, Cultivating Dissent: Wetlands Regulators Down on the Farm, FOUND. FOR
ECON. EDUC. (Feb. 1, 1996), https://fee.org/articles/cultivating-dissent-wetlands-regulators-down-on-thefarm/.
43. See generally 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii) (1986); see also Zippy Duvall, Swampbuster is Broken,
Congress Must Fix It, AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION (June 20, 2018),
https://www.fb.org/viewpoints/swampbuster-is-broken-congress-must-fix-it [hereinafter Duvall]
(“[P]rior-converted cropland . . . is exempt from Swampbuster, but agency employees have tried to narrow
that exemption out of existence.”).
44. See CWA Section 404 and Swampbuster: Wetlands on Agricultural Lands, ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, (last visited March 2, 2019) [hereinafter SWAMPBUSTER]
https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/section-404-and-swampbuster-wetlands-agricultural-lands.
45. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii) (1986) (“Activities which bring an area into farming . . . use are
not part of an established operation. An operation ceases to be established when the area on which it was
conducted has been converted to another use or has lain idle so long that modifications to the hydrological
regime are necessary to resume operations.”).
46. See Quick Stats, NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (2016) [hereinafter
Census]
https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/results/FE258E7B-4954-3D85-8C66-017C14A00DBF
(showing that, in 2016, 213,934 acres of corn and 199,378 acres of hay were harvested); see also FARMS
AND FARMLAND: NUMBERS, ACREAGE, OWNERSHIP, AND USE, 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE
HIGHLIGHTS,
(Sept.
2014)
[hereinafter
Farms
and
Farmland]
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Farms_and_Farmland/
Highlights_Farms_and_Farmland.pdf (noting that “[o]f the 915 million acres of land in farms in 2012,
45.4 percent was permanent pasture [and] . . . 42.6 percent was cropland. . . . “); see also Michael C.
Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory
Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 722 (1989)
(“Nevertheless, fulfillment of the congressional intent to exempt only slight modifications to areas
currently used as farmland rests uneasily on the shoulders of thousands of private actors making case-bycase decisions about whether their activities merit an exemption.”).
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to narrowly interpret the normal farming activities exemption. For example, the court
in United States v. Akers held that a farmer who tilled wetlands that had not produced
crops on a regular basis did not fall under the normal farming activities.47 The court
in Avolleyes Sportsmen League, Inc. v. Marsh held that where no farming operation
could have existed until long after the activities at issue completely changed the use
of the land, the activities were not normal farming activities.48
In addition to this narrow interpretation, farmers are also faced with the
Recapture Clause of § 404.49 This clause states that an activity is not exempt if it
creates a new use of a water that would result in an impairment of the flow or
circulation of a regulated water.50 Therefore, the farmer must prove that the activities
in question fall under the § 404 exemption but do not fall under the Recapture
Clause.51
Despite its comprehensive nature, the CWA does not mention wetlands.
Instead, wetlands are only addressed in the statutes and regulations that accompany
the CWA.52 The FSA created additional and more targeted regulations for
wetlands.53 The FSA includes a “Swampbuster” provision, enforced by the United
States Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) Natural Resources Conservation
Service (“NRCS”).54 This provision states that any farmer who drains or fills a
wetland in order to produce crops becomes ineligible for USDA funding.55 The FSA
also created the Commenced Conversion exemption from the Swampbuster
provision, which excludes lands for which the farmer has commenced conversion of

47. See 785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a farmer who tilled wetlands that had not
produced crops on a regular basis did not fall under the normal farming activities exemption).
48. See 715 F.2d 897 at 925-26 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that where no farming operation could have
existed until long after the activities at issue completely changed the use of the land, the activities were
not normal farming activities).
49
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (2012).
50. See id.; see also United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 76 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (holding that the
landowners were not entitled to the exemption to the permit requirement because their actions were meant
to bring the wetlands into cultivation, a use to which the land was not previously subject); see also John
Davidson, Protecting the Still Functioning Ecosystem: The Case of the Prairie Pothole Wetlands, 9
WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 123, 150-51 (2002) (“All potential exemptions are subject to a ‘recapture’
clause. . . . “).
51. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (2012); see also United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp.
1166, 1176 (D. Mass. 1986) (“[E]ven if [defendant] could establish that it is exempt from the permit
requirements under § 1344(f)(1), it must also demonstrate that its activities avoid ‘recapture’ under the
provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2).”).
52. See Daryn McBeth, Wetlands Conservation and Federal Regulation: Analysis of the Food
Security Act’s ‘Swampbuster’ Provisions as Amended by the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 201, 226 (1987) (noting that the FSA was the first federal
statute to explicitly use the term “wetland”).
53. See Food Security Act of 1985, 16 U.S.C. § 3821 (2012).
54. See id.
55. See id. (stating that any farmer who drains or fills a wetland in order to produce crops becomes
ineligible for USDA funding); see also John Dilliard, Don’t Be A Swampbuster, FARM JOURNAL,
https://www.agweb.com/article/dont-be-a-swampbuster-john-dillard/ (noting that for Swampbuster to
apply, “crop production does not actually have to occur on a converted wetland–it only needs to be a
possibility”).
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the wetland to productive farmland prior to December 23, 1985.56 The purpose of the
Commenced Conversion designation was to allow those who had begun a conversion
effort prior to December 23, 1985 to complete it without interference.57 In other
words, farmers who convert wetlands to croplands are still able to get USDA funding
if they can prove to the USDA that they started the conversion process prior to
December 23, 1985.58 All conversion efforts are required to have been completed
before January 1, 1995.59 If the government can show that a farmer has not completed
or actively pursued the conversion within the time period, the land is subject to the
Swampbuster provision.60 However, some precedent suggests that tolling the time
limitation on Commenced Conversions would be acceptable in certain
circumstances.61 For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lyng v. Payne determined
that tolling the time limitation on Commenced Conversions was acceptable where
the denial of a farmer’s loan application was arbitrary and capricious.62

56. See 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“No person shall become ineligible under section 3821 of
this title for program loans or payments . . . [a]s the result of the production of an agricultural
commodity on . . . [a] converted wetland if the conversion of the wetland was commenced
before December 23, 1985.”).
57. See 7 C.F.R. § 12.5(b)(2) (1996) (“The purpose of a determination of commenced conversion . . .
is to implement the legislative intent that those persons who had actually started conversion of a wetland
or obligated funds for conversion prior to Dec. 23, 1985, would be allowed to complete the conversion so
as to avoid unnecessary economic hardship.”).
58. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment Based on
Extraordinary Circumstances at 8, United States v. Brace, No. 90-229 (W.D. Pa. 2017) [hereinafter
Memorandum] (“A commenced conversion, therefore, is a conversion that, although initiated prior to
December 23, 1985, had not been completed prior to December 23, 1985, and consequently, required an
additional fixed time period to complete.”); see also Justin Lamunyon, Wetlands and the Swampbuster
Provisions: The Delineation Procedures, Options, and Alternatives for the American Farmer, 73 NEB. L.
REV. 163, 176 (1994) (“Conversion is commenced once actual work has been done or substantial funds
have been expended or legally committed by the purchase of construction supplies or material or
contracting for the work.”).
59. USDA Soil Conservation Serv., National Food Security Act Manual, Title 180 5th., at Sec.
514(B)(2) (Nov. 2010), [hereinafter Manual].
60. See 7 C.F.R. § 12.5(d)(5)(ii) (1996) (“‘Actively pursued’ means that efforts towards the
completion of the conversion activity have continued on a regular basis since initiation of the conversion,
except for delays due to circumstances beyond the person’s control.”).
61. See Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986) (stating that equitable tolling principles
applied to administrative appeals); see also Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 936 (1986) (“If, for example, a
farmer had filed a loan application prior to the expiration of the loan deadline and a court determined that
the denial of the application after the deadline’s expiration was “arbitrary, capricious and not in
accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), the appropriate remedy under the APA would be to direct
that the application be granted or reconsidered.”); see also Von Eye v. United States, 92 F.3d 681, 684
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that, under certain circumstances, the time limitation in 12.5(b)(5)(iii) could be
equitably tolled”).
62. See Lyng, 476 U.S. 926 at 936 (“If, for example, a farmer had filed a loan application prior to the
expiration of the loan deadline and a court determined that the denial of the application after the deadline’s
expiration was arbitrary, capricious and not in accordance with law, the appropriate remedy under the
APA would be to direct that the application be granted or reconsidered.”).
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Alternatively, wetlands converted to farmland prior to December 23, 1985
become Prior Converted Cropland that is not subject to the FSA’s Swampbuster.63
The National FSA Manual set out three conditions for Prior Converted status.64 First,
the land must have been planted at least once prior to December 23, 1985.65 Second,
the area must not have been abandoned.66 Third, a wetland conversion effort was
considered commenced if construction activities necessary for that conversion had
already begun or substantial funds had been committed to the conversion process. In
1990, the Corps issued Regulatory Guidance Letter 90-07, which excluded Prior
Converted Croplands from CWA jurisdiction because they were sufficiently
transformed from wetlands to dry farmland.67 Three years later, the EPA and the
Corps put forward a Joint Regulation excluding Prior Converted Cropland from the
definition of WOTUS.68 This Joint Regulation recognized that Prior Converted
Cropland no longer exhibited characteristics or functions of wetlands and therefore
should not be treated as such under the CWA.69 However, these regulations have not
been applied consistently to all farmers.70
B. The Case of Robert Brace
In 1975, Robert Brace purchased his father’s farm in Erie County,
Pennsylvania.71 The farm contained three hydrologically integrated tracts of land
with a road separating the two northernmost tracts from the one southernmost tract.72
63. See Manual, supra note 59, at Sec. 514.30 (describing the three conditions for PC status: first,
the crops must have been planted at least once prior to December 23, 1985; second, the land must not
have been abandoned; third, conversion activities must have actually begun or at least substantial funds
must have been committed for the purpose of converting the wetland); see also Kogan, supra note 28
(“The NFSAM defined abandonment as ‘the cessation of cropping, management, or maintenance
operations on prior converted croplands,’ including ‘repair of drainage system.’”); see also Megan
Stubbs, Conservation Compliance and U.S. Farm Policy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7, (2016),
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R42459.pdf
(“Under
the
wetlands
compliance provision, the following lands are considered exempt: . . . wetlands converted to cropland
before December 23, 1985, that have reverted back to a wetland as the result of a lack of drainage, lack
of management, or circumstances beyond the control of the landowner.”).
64. See Manual, supra note 59, at Sec 514.30.
65. See id.
66. See id. at Sec 514.33 (defining abandonment as “the cessation of cropping, management, or
maintenance operations on prior converted croplands”).
67. See U.S. Dep’t of Def. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Regulatory Guidance Letter 90-07—Subject:
Clarification of the Phrase ‘Normal Circumstances’ as it Pertains to Cropped Wetlands, at Sec. 5.d, (Sept.
26, 1990) (expired, Dec. 31, 1993).
68. See Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008 (“[W]e are excluding PC crop land from the definition of the
waters of U.S. in order to achieve consistency in the manner in which various federal programs address
wetlands.”).
69. See id. (“PC cropland no longer performs the functions . . . that the area did in its natural
condition. . . . “).
70. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1994); see also John Perdion, Comment,
Protecting Wetlands Through the Clean Water Act and the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bills: A Winning Trio,
28 U. TOL. L. REV., 867, 869 (1997) (displaying the sentiment that “the agricultural industry poses one of
the greatest threats to our country’s wetlands”).
71. See Bennett, supra note 1.
72. See Telephone Interview with Lawrence A. Kogan, Esq., Senior Exec., Kogan Law Group, P.C.
(October 3, 2018) [hereinafter Interview].
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Throughout his life, Brace witnessed his family farming all of these properties.73
Like the majority of farms in Erie County, Brace and his family used the farm for a
mixture of different agricultural purposes, including cultivating crops, pasturing
animals, and growing hay.74
In 1976, Brace repaired a drainage system on the thirty-two-acre Murphy
tract, a piece of land that had been part of the farm for decades.75 The Murphy tract
had previously been used for a variety of agricultural purposes.76 Like the rest of Erie
County, the land had a high water table and required drainage in order to be suitable
for planting.77 The drainage process involved excavation, soil leveling, and
installation of drainage tubing known as “drainage tile.”78 Tile drainage systems,
which have been used in the United States since the 1830s, are a foundational
component of nearly every farming operation.79 Most tile drainage systems require
excavation to a depth of at least three feet.80 Farmers who utilize tile drainage
systems have long considered periodic additions and repairs to the systems a regular
task.81
Brace performed these repairs with full USDA approval, even using a
conservation plan prepared for him by a branch of the agency.82 As part of the
conversion process, Brace had the PGC remove several beavers that had built dams

73. See Response, supra note 3, at 5 (describing Brace’s repair activities).
74. See Northwestern Woodland, Grassland, and Specialized Farming Region, c. 1830-1960, PA.
HISTORICAL & MUSEUM COMM’N, 12-13 (2012),
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/files/context/northwestern_woodland.pdf
[hereinafter Northwestern] (noting that, during this time, the Pennsylvanian farming economy “was
developing a highly diversified farming system which emphasized products that made use of woodland
and grassland resources”).
75. See Response, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that Brace’s grandfather had used the drainage system
years earlier).
76. See United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 Erie, 1, 6-7 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
77. See The Brace Travesty, John Ward, FRONTIERS WYOMING, Vol. 1, No. 2, (January 1997) (“Most
of Erie County is low-lying terrain with high water tables. Without adequate drainage, the surface areas
have a moisture content that adversely affects crop production. Therefore, a system of drainage ditches
and tiling are in absolute necessity to obtain sustainable yields.”).
78. See Motion for Relief from Judgment Based on Extraordinary Circumstances at 3, United States
v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 (W. D. Pa. 2017) [hereinafter Motion for Relief].
79. See Northwestern, supra note 74, at 136–37.
80. See John Panuska. PhD, The Basics of Agricultural Tile Drainage, BIOLOGICAL SYS. ENG’G
DEP’T UNIV. OF WIS., 5, https://fyi.uwex.edu/drainage/files/2015/09/Basic_Eng_-Princ-2_2017.pdf
(2017) (noting that most tile drain installations require excavation to a depth of between three and six
feet).
81. See OFFICE OF FARM MGMT., BUREAU OF PLANT INDUS., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE DRAINAGE
ON THE FARM–FARMERS BULLETIN 524, 3 (1916) http://nebula.wsimg.com/751da32d76+ba51505b9fc046680b0f268?AccessKeyId=7F494AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&alloworigin=1
[hereinafter FARMERS BULLETIN]; see also Tara Matthews, Best Practices for Agricultural Drainage Tile
Placement, FARM HORIZONS (Feb. 2016), http://www.herald-journal.com/farmhorizons/2016farm/tiling-best-practices.html (“Agricultural drainage tile has been used in crop fields for centuries.”);
Don Hofstrand, Understanding the Economics of Tile Drainage, Iowa State University (2010),
https://www.extension.iastate.edu/AGDM/wholefarm/html/c2-90.html (noting that the cleaning, repair,
and maintenance of drainage systems is a regular and necessary part of farming).
82. See Porter, supra note 42 (noting that Brace acted based on an existing USDA conservation plan).
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and caused drainage issues.83 He also hired, with the USDA’s approval, a dynamite
crew to help him clear out the existing drainage systems.84 In 1977, he received
USDA technical support and funding to repair and develop the drainage systems.85
He completed these actions pursuant to the 1962 conservation plan that his father
had established.86 His actions were also in accordance with USDA efforts to
encourage farmers in Erie County to maintain agricultural drainage systems on their
farms.87 At no point did the USDA inform Brace that he would need a permit for any
of his actions.88
Brace groomed the property from 1977 to 1983.89 Although he had not
completed the conversion by 1983, Brace was able to start growing crops on the
Murphy tract in 1987.90 Unfortunately, the beavers returned a year later and he had
to request that the PGC remove them again.91 This time, PGC agent Andy Martin
questioned Brace about what he had done with the land.92 The next day, twelve
vehicles with FWS, EPA, and Corps officials arrived on his farm without (according
to Brace’s attorney) a warrant or probable cause.93 They told him to stop all discharge
activities on his land or face fines of up to $50,000 per day.94 The officials claimed
that Brace was violating the CWA by discharging into a regulated wetland without
a permit.95 They ignored all of Brace’s attempts to explain his USDA approval.96
Immediately thereafter, Brace applied for a Commenced Conversion
designation from USDA to confirm that he had commenced the conversion of the
Murphy tract before December 23, 1985.97 The USDA determined that Brace had
commenced the conversion of the Murphy tract in 1977 and provided him with a
valid Commenced Conversion designation.98 This designation effectively gave his
83. See id. (noting the irony in the fact that these beavers were introduced to the area by the state of
Pennsylvania).
84. See Bennett, supra note 1.
85. See Brace v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 337, 342-43 (Cl. Ct. 2006).
86. See id. at 340-43.
87. See id. at 340-41.
88. See Motion for Relief, supra note 78, at 3.
89. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 18-19 (noting that the conversion effort had not been
completely finished by 1983).
90. See id. at 9; see also Porter, supra note 42 (stating that these activities included removing
fenceposts, replacing old drain tile, and putting the silt “collecting in the drain back onto the adjacent
fields from whence it had come”).
91. See Bennett, supra note 1.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Bennet, supra note 1.
95. See Bennett, supra note 1.
96. See id.
97. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 18-19 (noting that the conversion effort had not been
completely finished by 1983); see also Lawrence Kogan, Ducking the Truth About the Great ‘Commenced
Conversion’ Conspiracy Against America’s Farmers, 27 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 19, 20 (2018)
[hereinafter Kogan].
98. See Motion for Relief, supra note 78, at 6-7; see also Kogan, supra note 97, at 20 (“The official
[Commenced Conversion] designation evidenced that Mr. Brace had . . . physically commenced and
committed substantial financial funds toward the conversion from pastured wetlands to croplands of
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land Prior Converted status, exempting it from both the FSA’s Swampbuster
provision and the CWA’s permitting requirements.99 Brace received a letter from the
Erie County branch of the USDA confirming that his conversion efforts began before
December 23, 1985.100
Despite his Commenced Conversion designation, the EPA and the Corps
sued Brace on October 4, 1990 for violating § 404 of the CWA.101 In 1990, the United
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), acting in its capacity as representative of the
United States’ agencies, also sued Brace for violations of § 404 of the CWA.102 Brace
presented the District Court judge with proof of the permissions that he had secured
for his agricultural activities and was able to persuade the judge to rule in his favor.103
However, the DOJ appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
1994, arguing that Brace was ineligible for an exemption from the CWA
requirements because the Murphy tract was not part of an ongoing farming
operation.104 The government also argued that any exemptions Brace might have had
were lost when he converted the land in question from pasture to cropland.105 In other
words, the government maintained that changing the usage from pasture to cropland
constituted an interruption in the farming operation that nullified his protection from
regulation.106
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the DOJ, holding that
Brace’s actions prior to 1985 did not constitute ongoing or “normal agricultural
activity” for purposes of the CWA.107 The Third Circuit looked only at the Murphy
tract to determine whether there was a normal and ongoing farming operation
established.108 The court did so because it felt that the regulations failed to specify
the precise area to which the court should look, implying that it should only look at

portions of two farm fields situated within two of three contiguous and adjacent farm tracts comprising
his 157-acre hydrologically integrated farm located in Waterford Township, PA. For these purposes,
permissible conversion activities included the excavating and dredging, clearing, leveling, draining and
filling, etc. of dikes and ditches in wetlands so as to impair or reduce the flow, circulation or reach of
water.”).
99. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., WETLAND FACT SHEET–PRIOR
CONVERTED CROPLAND, https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/vt/programs/?
cid=nrcs142p2_010517 (last visited January 6, 2019).
100. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 10 (citing Exhibit 13, Erie Cty. ASCS Comm. Mtg. Minutes
9-14-88, at 2-3) (“[O]n September 21, 1988, Erie County ASCS Executive Director Joseph Burawa
dispatched a letter correspondence to Defendant Robert Brace apprising him of the Committee’s
determination that his ‘conversion of wetlands began before December 23, 1985, and [would] enable
[him] to complete the conversion and produce an agricultural commodity on the converted wetlands
without losing USDA benefits.’”).
101. See generally Complaint, United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
102. See Bennett, supra note 1.
103. See United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 Erie, 1, 16 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
104. See generally Brief for Appellant United States of America, United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117
(3d Cir. 1994).
105. See Bennett, supra note 1.
106. See id.
107. See Brace, 41 F.3d at 125; see also Perdion, supra note 70, at 869 (“The agricultural industry
poses one of the greatest threats to our country’s wetlands.”).
108. See Brace, 41 F.3d at 125.
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the tract in question as opposed to the entire farming operation.109 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on United States v. Cumberland Farms, which referred
to the “site” as the area of land the court should focus on.110 In addition, the Third
Circuit held that Brace’s activities between 1985 and 1987 were not part of an
established farming operation under the CWA.111
The Third Circuit referenced the fact that from 1977 to 1986, Brace’s
activities on the Murphy tract included no crop production or pasturing but were
instead focused on repairing the drainage systems.112 It reasoned that Brace’s
ancestors’ pre-1975 use of the land as farmland became irrelevant once Brace began
repairing the drainage system.113 The Third Circuit interpreted the statute narrowly
and limited normal farming activities to those that were chronologically
uninterrupted.114 Because the regulation states that a farming operation is not
ongoing if the hydrological regime must be modified in order to resume operations,
Brace’s modifications of the Murphy tract’s hydrology by repairing the drainage
system led the Third Circuit to conclude that there was no ongoing farming
operation.115 According to the Third Circuit, Brace’s actions could not be classified
as mere maintenance because they brought the land into a new use116 The Third
Circuit also determined that the District Court wrongly relied on Brace’s
Commenced Conversion designation because USDA regulations establish that a
Commenced Conversion designation does not override other federal water law.117
The Third Circuit reasoned that the only purpose of Commenced Conversion
designations is to prevent the loss of USDA funding benefits, not to exempt a farmer
from regulation.118

109. See id. (“The regulations do not specify the precise area to which we should look in determining
whether there is an established farming operation.”).
110. See United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1175 (D. Mass. 1986) (referring to
“the site”).
111. See Brace, 41 F.3d at 124-25 (“Brace’s activities between 1985 and 1987 meet neither prong of
this provision: they were neither part of an ‘established (i.e., on-going) farming operation,’ nor were they
conducted ‘in accordance with the definitions in § 323.4(a)(1)(iii).’”).
112. See id. at 126.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 127 (“Regardless of how typical or necessary such drainage systems may be in Erie County,
Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit for ‘activities which bring an area into farming . . . use,’ as
opposed to activities that are part of an ‘established farming operation.’”); see also The Clean Water Act’s
404(f) Exemptions, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (May 3, 2018) [hereinafter FEDERALIST SOCIETY],
https://fedsoc.org/events/the-clean-water-act-s-404-f-exemptions (statement of Peter Prows, Managing
Partner, Briscoe, Ivester, & Bazel, LLP) (noting that the current definition is more concerned with
chronology than with actual farming usage).
115. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii) (1986); see also Brace, 41 F.3d at 126-27.
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (2012) (“Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use
to which it was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired
or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required to have a permit under this section.”); see also
Brace, 41 F.3d at 128.
117. See Brace, 41 F.3d at 127.
118. See id.

32

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 61

Brace was unable to use several important documents to defend his
position.119 For instance, he could not use the regulatory guidance of the EPA and
the Corps that Prior Converted Cropland was excluded from CWA regulation
because it was issued after the administrative record for his case had closed.120
Additionally, no evidentiary documents—including engineer reports that supported
his position—were allowed in on Brace’s side due to the judge’s denial of his request
for additional time to find affordable engineers.121 Furthermore, the court did not
allow Brace to introduce copies of pre-1996 federal and state agency aerial
photographs of the Murphy tract showing that it had been dry farmland since at least
1979.122 Finally, Brace was unable to admit federal court testimony by EPA official
Jeffrey Lapp regarding the government’s proposed mitigation measures.123
As a result of the Third Circuit’s ruling, Brace signed a consent decree that
required him to restore the thirty-two-acre Murphy tract to pre-1985 conditions.124
He agreed to sign the consent decree because he feared more significant financial
penalties.125 The consent decree included a Restoration Plan, the aim of which was
to restore the hydrological wetland features that the government claimed were
originally on the Murphy tract.126 However, the Eco-Strategies Civil Engineering
report prepared on Brace’s behalf contained satellite images showing that the
Murphy tract was used as almost completely dry farmland from at least 1979 until

119. See Bennett, supra note 1.
120. See Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,031-35 (stating that PC cropland was excluded from CWA § 404
jurisdiction and FSA Swampbuster penalties); see also Motion for Relief, supra note 78, at 11
(“Defendants entered into a pretrial stipulation with the U.S. Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) on September
26, 1993 which acknowledged that the . . . area was a ‘wetland’ and ‘water of the United States’. . . . The
parties’ pretrial stipulation defined the terms ‘wetlands’ and ‘waters of the United States’ by reference
to . . . 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(r), respectively, which cover activities . . . that may or
may not be eligible for an exemption from CWA 404 permitting. The pretrial stipulation does not
reference the jointly issued August 1993 Corps and EPA regulations that . . . amended 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(8) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 by [excluding] prior commenced conversions from CWA Section 404
jurisdiction. . . . “).
121. See Interview, supra note 72.
122. See Curt Harler, Farmer Wins Round in 31-Year Wetland Legal Battle, AM. AGRICULTURIST
(Dec. 04, 2017), https://www.americanagriculturist.com/epa/farmer-wins-round-31-year-wetland-legalbattle [hereinafter Harler].
123. See id.
124. See Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree Pursuant to Clean Water Act at 3, 7, United States v.
Brace, No. 90–229 Erie, (W.D. Pa. 1996); see also Motion to Vacate Consent Decree and to Deny
Stipulated Penalties at 3, United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 (W.D. Pa. 1996) [hereinafter
Motion to Vacate].
125. See Bennett, supra note 1; see also Philadelphia Judges Gut Wetland Agricultural Exemption,
PA. LANDOWNERS’ ASSOC., INC., Vol. I, No. 1, 2 (Jan. 1995) (statement of Robert Brace) [hereinafter
Philadelphia Judges]
126. See Consent Decree at 3, 7, United States v. Brace, Civil Action 90-299 (W.D. Pa. 1996), Ex.1,
Attach A, Restoration Plan (requiring Brace to excavate the drainage tile system currently in place, fill in
multiple ditches, and install a check dam); see also Brace v. United States, No. 98-897L 1, 5 (Cl. Ct. 2006)
2005 WL 6133807 (testimony of Jeffrey Lapp) (“The goal of this restoration plan was to restore the
hydrologic drive back to this wetland system, and we used a target date of 1984.”).
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1993.127 The report even noted that the agency interference inappropriately
constrained Brace’s legal activity and in fact contributed to the flooding of his
property.128 Any wet areas shown by the satellite images were south of the Murphy
tract and were the result of recurring beaver activity that was out of Brace’s
control.129 In addition, historical aerial photographs of the Murphy tract showed that
it was dry farmland in 1984.130 Pennsylvania historical records also show that the
vast majority of farms in Erie County have been used for growing crops, pasturing
animals, growing hay, and more since the early 1800s.131 Nonetheless, Brace
removed the drainage tile, installed dams, and plugged ditches as directed by the
Restoration Plan.132 The beavers returned, causing flooding on both the Murphy tract
and two adjoining parts of his property that were unrelated to the case.133
In 2011, the EPA and the Corps authorized Brace to remove the beaver
dams after he informed them of the severe damage they were causing to his
property.134 On July 24, 2012, EPA and Corps officials came to Brace’s farm and
authorized him to conduct ditch maintenance and install drainage tile in certain areas
in preparation for planting.135 This authorization was evidenced to Brace through an
EPA-prepared Consent Decree map that showed the portions of his land where he
was allowed to conduct drainage and repair activities.136 Relying on the Consent
Decree map provided to him by the agency officials, Brace conducted drainage
127. Brace v. United States, No. 98-897L 1, 5 (Cl. Ct. 2006) (“[B]y the end of 1979, the site was dry,
with the exception of times of excessive rainfall.”); see also Report, supra note 10, at 3-4 (stating that the
“pre-1984 condition was dry farmland that was properly drained and either producing crops or was in the
process of being converted to produce crops as shown on the authentic historical aerial photos”); see also
Defendants Responsive Detailed Statement to United States Concise Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts in Support of United States Motion for Summary Judgment at 33-39, United States v. Brace, Civil
Action No. 1:17-cv-00006-BR (W.D. Pa. 2018) [hereinafter Responsive Statement] (noting that the site
“did not historically constitute a ‘wetland,’ did not previously constitute a wetland in 2012-2013, and
currently does not constitute a ‘wetland’”).
128. See Report, supra note 10, at 3-4 (noting that agency interference was actually one of the primary
causes of the creation of wetland conditions because they did not allow him to maintain the ditches).
129. See id.
130. See Motion to Vacate, supra note 124, Ex. 6, April 1973 Satellite Image of Murphy Farm.
131. See Northwestern, supra note 74, at 10-19.
132. See Bennett, supra note 1.
133. See Motion to Vacate, supra note 124, at 7 (“Together with the 1996 Consent Decree Restoration
Plan features requiring the plugging of surface ditches, the cutting of all drainage tile lines legally installed
in legally excavated ditches, and the installation of a substantially relocated and overbuilt check dam, the
recurring beaver dams and clogged culverts steadily contributed to the transformation of the Murphy Farm
tract into a primordial wetland that had not previously existed during Defendant Robert Brace’s
lifetime.”); see also Lawrence A. Kogan, When Assessing Burdens for Farmers, Other Landowners, White
House Shouldn’t Duck Overhaul of Wetlands Regulatory Juggernaut, THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (Feb. 9,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3122790.
134. See Motion to Vacate, supra note 124, at 9-10 (noting that the actions required by the Restoration
Plan had caused the flooding to extend beyond the consent decree area); see also E-mail from Todd Lutte,
EPA, to Robert Brace, (Sept. 12, 2011, 11:59 AM EST), http://nebula.wsimg.com/
4d2c02362cc6052014857f598d6be000?AccessKeyId=7F494AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&allo
worigin=1 [hereinafter Lutte] (“This activity may be undertaken provided there is no discharge of dredge
or fill material to Waters of the US. . . . “).
135. See Bennett, supra note 1; see also infra 137, at 23-24.
136. See Response, supra note 3, at 58-59, Ex. 58 [Map 1].
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maintenance on the two portions of the land at issue in order to prepare for
planting.137
However, in January 2017, the EPA reopened the 1990 Murphy tract case,
alleging that Brace had violated the 1996 Consent Decree by cleaning the ditches
and planting crops.138 The agency also charged Brace for allegedly violating § 404
of the CWA on the northernmost Marsh tract based on the same ditch-cleaning and
planting actions.139 The same set of actions, therefore, caused both the reopening of
the 1990 Murphy tract case and the filing of the 2017 Marsh tract case.140 The
government subsequently claimed to have authorized the actions in error.141 They
disavowed the Consent Decree map that they had initially provided Brace with and
produced a second map of the Consent Decree property—a copy of which Brace
asserts he was never provided—that they had allegedly based their analysis on. 142
Relevant to Brace’s decision to plant and his subsequent challenging of the
agencies’ actions as a misrepresentation of their previous authorizations is the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is used to prevent Party A from bringing a claim
against Party B when Party B has relied to its detriment on Party A’s
misrepresentations.143 To do so, Party B must establish that it relied to its detriment
on Party A’s misrepresentation and that its reliance was reasonable because it did not
know—nor should it have known—that Party A was misrepresenting themselves.144
The majority of circuits allow the equitable estoppel doctrine to be used against

137. See generally id.
138. See Brief in Support of Motion to Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties at 1,
United States v. Brace, No. 1:90-cv-229 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2017), ECF No. 83 [hereinafter Brief for
Petitioner].
139. See Complaint Against All Defendants at 8, No. 1:17-cv-6-BR (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2017), ECF No.
1.
140. See Interview, supra note 72.
141. See Responsive Statement supra note 127, Ex. 36, Lutte Dep. 264:2–6, ECF No. 84-36
(describing how Lutte and his colleagues made the field determination for Brace’s planting activities but
later informed him that their “determination was made in error”).
142. See Response, supra note 3, Ex. 59 [Map 2].
143. See Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty. v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom., Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51 (1984);
see Fredericks v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 126 F.3d 433, 440 (1997) where the Third Circuit
addressed equitable estoppel in the context of governmental entities in Fredericks v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, where it held that IRS misrepresentations to a taxpayer regarding an extension of the
statute of limitations constituted affirmative misconduct that warranted application of the equitable
estoppel doctrine.
144. See Heckler, 467 U.S. at 59; United States v. Asmar, 827 F.2d 907, 912 (3d Cir. 1987). In light
of this background, the traditional elements of equitable estoppel in the context of government entities
like the EPA and the Corps include (1) a misrepresentation by the government (2) that constitutes
affirmative misconduct and (3) was reasonably relied upon by the claimant. See also Fredericks, 126 F.3d
at 450.
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governments.145 However, in such cases the claimant must also establish “affirmative
misconduct” by the government or its officials.146
Six months later, after an extensive series of pleadings from Brace’s
attorney, a federal judge in the Western District of Pennsylvania agreed to authorize
new discovery for the 1990 Murphy tract case to determine the nature of the Consent
Decree.147 This authorization meant that the evidence Brace was not allowed to bring
in for the initial 1990 proceeding was now presentable.148 Brace subsequently filed
an $8 million administrative action against the EPA, the Corps, and the FWS under
the FTCA, requesting financial compensation for twenty years of damage to his land
and improper regulatory enforcement.149 Brace’s attorney also filed two Rule 60(b)
pleadings—one to vacate the Consent Decree and one for relief from the judgment.150
Throughout the course of the lawsuit, Brace’s attorneys uncovered evidence
of a coordinated FWS enforcement effort to override the Commenced Conversion
designations of farmers in multiple midwestern states.151 On one such occasion, the
FWS executed a memorandum with the USDA-NRCS, EPA, and the Corps in

145. See Ritter v. United States, 28 F.2d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1928) (“The acts or omissions of the officers
of the government, if they be authorized to bind the United States in a particular transaction, will work
estoppel against the government.”).
146. See Asmar, 827 F.2d at 911 n.4 (noting the additional burden on the claimant to show “affirmative
misconduct on the part of the government officials”); see also Califano, 698 F.2d at 622 (noting that
affirmative misconduct includes statements that “are so closely connected to the basic fairness of the
administrative decision making process that the government may be estopped from disavowing the
misstatement” and holding that affirmative misconduct existed where the government’s statements
induced the healthcare provider to submit reports that it otherwise would not have). Equitable estoppel
doctrine has been applied to many federal agencies. See, e.g., Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155,
1169 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that U.S. Postal Service may be estopped from claiming packages were
merchandise and from applying lower insurable limit if plaintiff could prove that postal clerk assured her
the packages could be insured as nonnegotiable documents up to a higher limit); Brandt v. Hickel, 427
F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1970) (estopping the Bureau of Land Management from denying bidder priority
where agent gave erroneous advice that resubmitting proposal would not result in loss of priority); Payne
v. Block, 714 F.2d 1510, 1517–18 (11th Cir. 1983) (estopping government from adhering to the previously
established deadline because government agents failed to notify potential applicants of loans), vacated,
469 U.S. 807 (1984) and rev’d sub nom., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986); Manloading & Mgmt.
Assocs. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1299, 1303 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (holding that Department of Housing and
Urban Development was estopped from denying renewal of contract with plaintiff where authorized agent
had assured prospective bidders that funds were available and contract would be renewed); Dana Corp. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 1032, 1046 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (holding that the Post Office Department was estopped
from denying effects of agent’s decision to continue to pay and not inform plaintiff-supplier that it was
performing in excess of contract requirements).
147. See generally Order, United States v. Brace, No. 1:90-cv-229 (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2017), ECF No.
146.
148. See Interview, supra note 72.
149. See Attachment to Notice of Filing of Administrative Claims Against the United States, United
States v. Brace, No. 1:90-cv-229 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2017), ECF No. 156-1; see also Harler, supra note 122
(“[T]hat 30-acre plot might have produced 52,800 bushels of corn . . . over the past 11 seasons.”).
150. See Motion to Vacate, supra note 124; see also Motion for Relief, supra note 78.
151. See Kogan, supra note 97, at 43 (“Newly revealed evidence clearly shows how the FWS also had
interfered with . . . [Commenced Conversion] determinations in Minnesota, North Dakota and South
Dakota at approximately the same time. . . . [T]hese submissions indicate how very closely senior
officials . . . had worked with prominent nongovernmental environmental . . . special interest groups . . .
to ensure the reversal of USDA-ASCS [Commenced Conversion] determinations.”).
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January 1994 addressing the implementation of the Swampbuster provision for
purposes of CWA § 404 compliance.152 The memorandum stated that NRCS, in
consultation with FWS, would certify wetlands delineations made prior to November
28, 1990 to ensure that they were correct.153 This memorandum effectively enabled
NRCS and FWS to retroactively reconsider wetlands determinations that had
informed legitimate Commenced Conversion designations.154
C. The Controversy Surrounding Administrative Action
Robert Brace is not alone.155 Other farmers have been similarly affected by
agency action. For instance, the government sued California farmer John Duarte for
plowing his own field.156 The government claimed that seasonal water gatherings on
certain parts of the land subjected it to regulation despite the fact that the land had
been used as farmland for over two decades.157 In addition, the action of plowing
was held not to be a normal farming activity because the land had been used as
pasture for roughly thirty years in between crop uses.158 Similarly, Springfield,
Illinois lawyer Kurt Wilke was sued by the government three times for allegedly
filling in a wetland on land that had been farmed for more than 100 years.159
However, Wilke bought the property complete with a USDA form confirming that it
was not a wetland.160 The government never visited the site.161 These cases further
suggest the need for a careful consideration of the regulatory framework that is the
subject of this article.162
152. See Memorandum of Agreement Among the Dep’t of Agric., the Envtl. Prot. Agency, the Dep’t
of the Interior, and the Dep’t of the Army, Concerning the Delineation of Wetlands for Purposes of Section
404 of the Clean Water Act and Subtitle B of the Food Security Act, (1-6-94),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/200053FC.PDF?Dockey=200053FC.PDF [hereinafter MOA].
153. See id.
154. See Kogan, supra note 97.
155. See Damon Arthur, He plowed his field; now he faces a $2.8 million fine, USA TODAY NETWORK
(May 24, 7:07 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/05/24/farmer-plowingfine/339756001/ [hereinafter Arthur].
156. See Robin Abcarian, A land-use case that’s enough to furrow a farmer’s brow, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
15, 2016, 2:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-0115-abcarian-farmer-wetlands20160115-column.html.
157. See Chris Bennett, When a Farmer Punches Back at the Feds, AGWEB (May 1, 2017, 8:02 AM),
https://www.agweb.com/article/when-a-farmer-punches-back-at-the-feds-naa-chris-bennett/ (“Twenty
years of wheat production followed by 15 years of livestock production wasn’t a continuous farming
operation, according to DOJ.”).
158. See Order Granting United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 34; Duarte Nursery, Inc. v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, No. 2:13-cv-02095-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2016), ECF
No. 195.
159. See Deana Stroich, Illinoisans Ask For Swampbuster Reform, FARMWEEKNOW, (July 16, 2018),
https://farmweeknow.com/story-illinoisans-ask-swampbuster-reform-3-177586 (statement of Adam
Nielsen, Illinois Farm Bureau) (“Everyone we met with quickly recognized that if [Kurt Wilke] weren’t
a lawyer and a farmer, NRCS and the appeals process would have buried him and wrongfully denied his
family’s right to farm land that should never have been in question.”).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See infra Part III (arguing that Robert Brace should prevail because he was falsely accused of
violating federal regulations with which he was in compliance or exempt from).
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The Brace case and its companions have contributed to the existing debate
about the proper role of administrative agencies.163 While some maintain that
administrative agencies are a proper extension of the executive power, others feel
that administrative agencies wield an unconstitutional power.164 For instance, the
famous case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is
well known for Justice Stevens’s majority opinion, which established the idea that
courts should give significant deference to agency interpretations.165 This viewpoint
has been present in American jurisprudence for many years, as evidenced by former
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s observation in
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.166 In his opinion, Chief Justice Taft stated
that administrative action is a regular and necessary part of the government
machine.167 Scholars continue to hold this view, arguing that the administrative state
holds an indispensable position in American government.168 On the other hand,
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts stated in City of Arlington
v. Federal Communications Commission that administrative agencies contradict the
separation of powers concept that is central to the American constitutional structure
by effectively utilizing all three powers of government.169 Justice Clarence Thomas
echoed Roberts’ concerns in multiple cases, noting that the grant of power to each
governmental branch is supposed to be exclusive.170 Proponents of this perspective
adhere to James Madison’s statement that the consolidation of all three governmental

163. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 1994); Arthur, supra note 155; Stroisch,
supra note 162161.
164. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations.”); Perez v. Mort. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 112-113 (2015) (Thomas,
J.) (noting that deferring to administrative agencies “undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check
on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to
prevent”).
165. Id (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference
to administrative interpretations.”).
166. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (Taft, C.J.).
167. See id. at 406 (“Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the executive branch
within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in
such officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution.”).
168. See Charles H. Koch Jr., Confining Judicial Authority over Administrative Action, 49 MO. L.
REV. 183, 183 (1984) (“The administrative process is designed for the purpose of efficiently delivering
government services to citizens.”).
169. See City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.) (noting how
administrative agencies “as a practical matter . . . exercise legislative power, . . . executive power . . . and
judicial power.”).
170. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 67 (2015) (Thomas, J.) (“[T]he
Constitution does not vest the Federal Government with an undifferentiated ‘governmental power.’
Instead, the Constitution identifies three types of governmental power and, in the Vesting Clauses,
commits them to three branches of Government. . . . These grants are exclusive.”); Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 112-113 (2015) (Thomas, J.) (noting that deferring to administrative agencies
“undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check on the other branches, and it subjects regulated
parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”).
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powers in one body is dangerously akin to tyranny.171 This viewpoint can be traced
back to eighteenth-century French philosopher Montesquieu, who believed that the
combination of all three governmental powers in a single entity was the antithesis of
liberty.172 In addition, many in legal academia argue that the administrative state piles
excess bureaucracy on the country’s democratic system.173
The Brace case highlights this tension regarding the proper role of the
administrative state. Nearly thirty years after initial proceedings, Brace is still
fighting the regulatory structures at the center of his two lawsuits.174 The extent of
administrative power over private individuals is the underlying current of the Robert
Brace story. However, before discussing the policy and regulatory implications of
the Brace case, both the Third Circuit’s ruling and the agencies’ treatment of Brace’s
Commenced Conversion designation deserve a closer look.175
III. VINDICATING ROBERT BRACE
Robert Brace was wrongfully convicted under the FSA for three reasons.176
First, the Third Circuit incorrectly characterized Brace’s pre-1985 activities on the
Murphy tract as not being normal farming activities.177 Second, the agencies and the
Third Circuit wrongly ignored Brace’s Commenced Conversion designation,
denying him the protection from CWA permitting requirements that he was due.178
Third, the Third Circuit should use the equitable estoppel doctrine to bar the agencies

171. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (stating that the “accumulation of all three powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny”).
172. See CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS COMPLETE
WORKS, vol. 1, 199 (London, T. Evans 1748) (“When the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may
arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner. Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator.”).
173. See Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. &
COM. 585, 590 (1996) (“By regulating vital decisions about environmental risk management through a
remote, arcane, and piecemeal bureaucratic process, the command and control system necessarily runs a
serious democracy deficit.”); see also Hunter S. Higgins, Deference, Due Process, and the Definition of
Water: Dredging the Clean Water Act, 20 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 305, 307 (2017) (“[T]he CWA
presents a stark illustration of how a seemingly limitless scope of authority can often lead to an abuse of
power.”).
174. See Bennett, supra note 1.
175. See infra Part III (arguing that Robert Brace should prevail because he was falsely accused of
violating federal regulations with which he was in compliance or exempt from).
176. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 1994).
177. See id. (“Regardless of how typical or necessary such drainage systems may be in Erie County,
Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit for ‘activities which bring an area into farming . . . use,’ as
opposed to activities that are part of an ‘established farming operation.’”).
178. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 10 (“[O]n September 21, 1988, Erie County ASCS Executive
Director Joseph Burawa dispatched a letter correspondence to Defendant Robert Brace apprising him of
the Committee’s determination that his ‘conversion of wetlands began before December 23, 1985, and
[would] enable [him] to complete the conversion and produce an agricultural commodity on the converted
wetlands without losing USDA benefits.’”).
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from pursuing legal action against Brace for his 2012 activities, which do not
constitute violations of either the consent decree or the CWA.179
A. The Third Circuit Incorrectly Determined That Brace’s Pre-1985 Activities
on the Murphy Tract Were Not Normal Farming Activities
Brace’s pre-1985 activities on the Murphy tract constitute normal farming
activities under the language of CWA § 404.180 His drainage system repairs were
common agricultural operations that he invested substantial amounts of time and
money in on a nearly annual basis.181 Brace’s actions were part of an established
farming operation because the historical data clearly shows that the original state of
the farm was an agricultural one.182 The Murphy tract has been farmed by Brace’s
ancestors since the 1930s.183 Pennsylvania historical records reveal that the vast
majority of farms in Erie County have been used since the early 1800s for a mixture
of different purposes, including cultivating crops, pasturing animals, and growing
hay.184 Satellite images show that the Murphy tract was used as farmland and was
almost completely dry from at least 1983 until 1993.185 In addition, historical aerial
photographs of the Murphy tract show that it was dry farmland in 1984.186 The
definition of a “normal farming activities” for purposes of the Robert Brace case is
therefore a mixed-industry farm, not a wetland.187 Thus, complying with the
Restoration Plan’s instructions to restore the Murphy tract to its original state would
actually require Brace to restore the tract to farmland.188 The government effectively
179. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) (noting that
equitable estoppel is a means for avoiding injustice).
180. See United States v. Brace, C.A. No. 90-229 Erie, slip op. at 23 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1993)
(“Defendants’ activities in commencing conversion of the site prior to December 23, 1985, and in
obtaining status as ‘commenced conversion’ from the ASCS are evidence that Brace and Brace Farms
have establish an ongoing farming operation on the site.”).
181. See Census, supra note 46 (showing that, in 2016, 213,934 acres of corn and 199,378 acres of
hay were harvested); see also Farms and Farmland, supra note 46 (noting that “[o]f the 915 million acres
of land in farms in 2012, 45.4 percent was permanent pasture, [and] 42.6 percent was cropland.”);
Memorandum, supra note 58, at 57 (stating that Brace worked “on a continuous and regular basis in these
areas in 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986 and 1987”).
182. See Northwestern, supra note 74, at 136.
183. Response, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining that the land in question had been farmed by Brace’s
father and grandfather).
184. See Northwestern, supra note 74, at 12-13, 136.
185. See Brace v. United States, No. 98-897L, slip op. at 5 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 4, 2006) (“[B]y the end of
1979, the site was dry, with the exception of times of excessive rainfall.”); see also Report, supra note 10,
at 4 (stating that the “pre-1984 condition was dry farmland that was properly drained and either producing
crops or was in the process of being converted to produce crops as shown on the authentic historical aerial
photos.”).
186. See Motion to Vacate, supra note 124, at Ex. 6.
187. See Responsive Statement, supra note 127, at 34 (noting that the site “did not historically
constitute a ‘wetland,’ did not previously constitute a wetland in 2012-2013, and currently does not
constitute a ‘wetlands.’”).
188. See Motion to Vacate, supra note 124, at 11 (“The only possible way to restore the Murphy Farm
tract to its original ‘wet’ state would have been for the Consent Decree to have ordered restoration back
to its physical condition prior to or during the early twentieth century before it had even been cultivated
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changed the normal state of the land from agriculture to wetland by requiring Robert
Brace, through the Restoration Plan, to turn the tract into a wetland.189
Brace’s repair activities should have been deemed to be normal farming
activities because they are essential components of any Erie County farming
operation and were necessary to maintain the drainage system.190 The utilization of
tile drainage systems began as early as the 1830s and were on nearly every farm by
1955.191 Since that time, periodic additions and repairs to drainage systems have been
a regular part of every farming operation.192 Brace’s activities, which included the
installation of drainage tile, were in fact necessary prerequisites for the completion
of the conversion effort.193 The Third Circuit felt that Brace’s actions could not be
classified as mere maintenance of the drainage system because they brought the land
into a new use.194 However, the previous state of the Murphy tract and the entire
surrounding area was agricultural.195 Brace’s drainage-related activities did not bring
the Murphy tract into agricultural use; they were aimed at repairing the drainage
system for the existing agricultural use.196 Brace’s activities could fit within many of
the exempted activities listed in § 404, such as minor drainage repairs, crop
production, upland soil and water conservation practices, maintenance of drainage

for livestock pasturing and hay cropping.”); see also Report, supra note 10, at 3 (“[T]o return the property
to the pre-1984 condition, . . . [the] area would be drained and converted back to drive farmland . . . .”);
Northwestern, supra note 74, at 136.
189. Interview with Lawrence A. Kogan, supra note 72 (“The feds effectively used this method to
change the ‘normal condition’ of the Brace Erie Cty. farm from agriculture to pristine wetlands for CWA
404 purposes.”).
190. United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 Erie, 1, 3 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (“Extensive
underground drainage systems are typical and necessary aspects of farming in Erie County, and the
installation of such systems is a normal farming activity in order to make land suitable for farming.”).
191. See generally Northwestern, supra note 74, at 136.
192. FARMERS BULLETIN, supra note 81, at 10 (“Where it is possible to install a whole drainage system
on a farm at one time it is by all means advisable. In actual practice, however, such a condition seldom
occurs. Not many farmers have the money, Time, or labor to do it all within a short period, or even within
a year. Therefore, most of the tile-drainage work must be done as it has been done in the past, a part at a
time, until it is all accomplished. This means that the farmers should first drain those parts of his farm that
need it most sport on which the profits will be the greatest. . . . “).
193. Ward, supra note 77 (“Brace advised [USDA-ASCS] he wanted to put in crops and they agreed
that underground tiling should be placed at certain positions for surface drainage.”); see also Hofstrand,
supra note 81(noting that the cleaning, repair, and maintenance of drainage systems is a regular and
necessary part of farming).
194. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 1994); see generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2)
(2012) (“Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters incidental to any activity
having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously
subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of such waters be
reduced, shall be required to have a permit under this section.”).
195. See generally Responsive Statement, supra note 187, at 31 (noting that the site “did not
historically constitute a ‘wetland,’ did not previously constitute a wetland in 2012-2013, and currently
does not constitute a ‘wetland.’”).
196. See id.; Duvall, supra note 43 (“A wetland can only be converted to farmland once. Making the
land more farmable does not (cannot) convert it a second time.”); Porter, supra note 42 (“No matter that
pasturing livestock and growing crops are both archetypal farming activities: the government argued
successfully that even if the field was previously part of an established farming operation when it was
used for pasture, it lost farmland status in 1978 when Brace began preparing it for crops.”).
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and tiling, or maintenance of drainage ditches.197 This possibility is made particularly
clear by the text of the 2007 Regulatory Guidance Letter 07-02, which notes that the
term “maintenance” includes excavation, erosion management, and repair or
replacement of existing structures in order to preserve their working condition.198
These facts suggest that the Third Circuit incorrectly held that Brace’s pre-1985
activities on the Murphy tract were not normal, ongoing farming activities.199
The District Court’s determination is the correct outcome.200 The District
Court held that Brace’s activities on the Murphy tract constituted normal farming
activities, per the statute, because they were normal for a farmer in Erie County.201
This distinction is important because, as the District Court noted, determining what
constitutes normal farming activities is a fact and context-specific inquiry.202 The
District Court’s conclusion was based on the fact that Brace’s activities on the
Murphy tract after 1985 did not bring the land into a new use.203 Additionally, the
District Court noted that the tract has remained in the possession and use of the same
family for over sixty years.204 Finally, the District Court emphasized the fact that
there was a USDA conservation plan in place to ensure productive use of the tract.205
The District Court correctly saw that Brace’s activities constituted regular and
ongoing farm maintenance efforts that were exempt from CWA regulation.206
There is a legitimate argument that the Third Circuit’s determination was
based on a valid interpretation of the statutory framework.207 The Third Circuit stuck
to a strict interpretation of the statute that limited normal farming activities to those

197. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2012) (describing normal farming as “plowing, seeding, cultivating,
minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water
conservation practices . . . “).
198. See Regulatory Guidance Letter 07-02, supra note 34, at 4-5 (noting that drainage ditch
maintenance includes “activities such as [e]xcavation of accumulated sediments back to original
contours[, r]e-shaping of the side slopes[, b]ank stabilization to prevent erosion where reasonably
necessary using best management practices . . . [,] and [r]eplacement of existing control structures, where
the original function is not changed and original approximate capacity is not increased. Maintenance is
generally viewed as involving activities that keep something in its existing state or proper condition or
preserve it from failure or decline”).
199. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1994).
200. See United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229, Erie, 1, 8 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
201. See id. at 3 (“Extensive underground drainage systems are typical and necessary aspects of
farming in Erie County, and the installation of such systems is a normal farming activity in order to make
land suitable for farming.”).
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 10.
204. Id.
205. See id. (“This plan and the defendant’s efforts to reach its goal, as financing permitted, was not
directed to converting in the mid 1980s a regulation defined wetland area to a new crop production area.”).
206. See id. (“Such courses of action, together with regularly cleaning of the drainage system on the
site, constituted maintenance of the drainage system on the site, constituted maintenance of the drainage
system, and as such, is exempt from the permit requirements of the CWA.”)
207. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the regulations make it
clear that a farming operation should not be considered normal or ongoing where hydrological
modifications are necessary in order to resume farming).
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that were chronologically uninterrupted.208 However, the realities of farming in the
United States do not align with such an interpretation.209 Those realities suggest that
normal farming activities are not limited by chronology or crop type. If nothing else,
the Third Circuit’s determination strongly suggests that the statutory definition of
normal farming activities should be revised to reflect a more realistic understanding
of agriculture. Even if the Third Circuit’s interpretation was in line with the statute,
this case displays the urgent need for a redefinition of the statute in order to
accurately reflect the variety of activities involved in agricultural production.210
B. The Agencies Wrongly Ignored Brace’s Commenced Conversion
Designation
The Third Circuit and the agencies involved incorrectly ignored Brace’s
Commenced Conversion designation, which exempted Brace from regulation under
the FSA’s Swampbuster provision and the CWA’s permitting requirements.211
Commenced Conversions exclude from the Swampbuster provision lands where the
farmer commenced conversion of the wetland to farmland prior to December 23,
1985. Thus, the Third Circuit also effectively determined that Brace had not begun
the conversion effort prior to December 23, 1985.212 However, Brace has
documentation from the Erie County USDA office stating that his conversion effort
began prior to that date.213 In addition, any failure to complete the conversion on time
was because of beaver activity, the government’s intrusion, and the subsequent
208. See id. at 127 (“Regardless of how typical or necessary such drainage systems may be in Erie
County, Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit for ‘activities which bring an area into farming . . .
use,’ as opposed to activities that are part of an ‘established farming operation.’”); see also FEDERALIST
SOCIETY, supra note 114 (discussing the chronological definition of normal farming activities).
209. See generally Census, supra note 46 (showing that, in 2016, 213,934 acres of corn and 199,378
acres of hay were harvested); Farms and Farmland, supra note 46 (noting that “[o]f the 915 million acres
of land in farms in 2012, 45.4 percent was permanent pasture [and] . . . 42.6 percent was cropland. . . . “).
210. See Farms and Farmland, supra note 46.
211. Brace, 41 F.3d at 127 (“[T]he district court erred in relying upon a determination from the ASCS
in September of 1988 that Brace had ‘commenced conversion’ of his property from wetland to cropland
prior to December 23, 1985, as evidence of an ‘established farming operation’ at the site.”); see also
Bennett, supra note 1 (“Brace was sealed in a CWA box, and no matter which way he turned, he wasn’t
allowed to use the Food and Security Act of 1985 to say his farmland activity was protected from CWA
jurisdiction.”).
212. 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“No person shall become ineligible under section 3821 of this
title for program loans or payments . . . [a]s the result of the production of an agricultural
commodity on . . . [a] converted wetland if the conversion of the wetland was commenced
before December 23, 1985.”); see also Kogan, supra note 97, at 20 (“The official [Commenced
Conversion] designation evidenced that Mr. Brace had . . . physically commenced and committed
substantial financial funds toward the conversion from pastured wetlands to croplands of portions of two
farm fields situated within two of three contiguous and adjacent farm tracts comprising his 157-acre
hydrologically integrated farm located in Waterford Township, PA. For these purposes, permissible
conversion activities included the excavating and dredging, clearing, leveling, draining and filling, etc. of
dikes and ditches in wetlands so as to impair or reduce the flow, circulation or reach of water.”).
213. Memorandum, supra note 58, at 10 (“[O]n September 21, 1988, Erie County ASCS Executive
Director Joseph Burawa dispatched a letter correspondence to Defendant Robert Brace apprising him of
the Committee’s determination that his ‘conversion of wetlands began before December 23, 1985, and
[would] enable [him] to complete the conversion and produce an agricultural commodity on the converted
wetlands without losing USDA benefits.’”).
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Restoration Plan that made it impossible for him to farm his land, even land not
included in the consent decree area.214 All three of these circumstances were
completely out of Brace’s control.215
The Third Circuit explained its reason for disregarding Brace’s
Commenced Conversion designation by pointing out that a Commenced Conversion
designation does not override other federal water laws.216 This fact may be true, but
this case did not deal with “other” water laws—it dealt with the two laws that the
Commenced Conversion designation was expressly created to provide exemption
from!217 It is difficult to see the point of having the exemption at all if the Third
Circuit can reason that a statutory exemption does not apply simply because it does
not override various “other” laws.218
The Third Circuit also reasoned that the sole purpose of a Commenced
Conversion designation is to prevent the loss of USDA funding benefits, not to
exempt a farmer from regulation.219 This reasoning is also incorrect because the
National FSA Manual makes it clear that Commenced Conversion designations, by
signaling that the farmer has commenced the conversion before December 23, 1985,
effectively provide the farmer with Prior Converted status.220 This status shields the
farmer from regulation and enables him to receive USDA program funding. The
Third Circuit’s view of Brace’s Commenced Conversion designation therefore
contradicted the very purpose of the designation. In addition, the Third Circuit’s
dismissal of Brace’s Commenced Conversion designation and the Prior Converted
status it gave him contradicted the EPA’s determination that Prior Converted
Cropland was excluded from both CWA and FSA jurisdiction.221
Brace’s case may also be an indicator of a larger, more coordinated agency
effort to interfere with the legitimate Commenced Conversion designations of
farmers in multiple midwestern states.222 FWS executed a memorandum in January
214. Report, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that agency interference was actually one of the primary causes
of the creation of wetland conditions because they did not allow him to maintain the ditches); Motion to
Vacate, supra note 124, at 3.
215. See Motion to Vacate, supra note 124, at 3; see also Kogan, supra note 97, at 22 (“These Federal
agencies also failed to affirmatively establish that Mr. Brace had not completed (i.e., abandoned) the
conversion of those fields before the expiration of the FSA regulation’s prescribed window due to
circumstances other than those beyond his control.”).
216. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 1994) (arguing that a Commenced
Conversion designation does not nullify requirements under State or Federal water laws).
217. See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); Food Security
Act of 1985, 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A) (2012).
218. See Brace, 41 F.3d at 126-27.
219. Id. at 127.
220. See Kogan, supra note 97 at 20 (“The official [Commenced Conversion] designation rendered
the conversion of his designated fields from wetlands to croplands eligible to receive USDA program
funding pursuant to the exemption (from USDA financial program benefit ineligibility) available under
the Food Security Act of 1985 (‘FSA’), as if USDA had designated those [Commenced Conversion] fields
as ‘prior converted’ (‘PC’) croplands.”); see also Manual, supra note 59, at Sec. 512.31 (stating that if a
wetland is converted to farmland prior to December 23, 1985, it becomes Prior Converted Cropland that
is not subject to the FSA’s Swampbuster provision).
221. See Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,031-45,035 (stating that PC cropland was excluded from CWA
§ 404 jurisdiction and FSA Swampbuster penalties).
222. Cf. Kogan, supra note 97.
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1994 with the USDA-NRCS, EPA, and Corps addressing the implementation of the
Swampbuster provision of the FSA.223 The memorandum stated that the NRCS, in
consultation with the FWS, would certify wetlands delineations that were made prior
to November 28, 1990 to ensure they were accurate.224 This memorandum effectively
enabled the NRCS and FWS to retroactively reconsider wetlands determinations that
had informed legitimate Commenced Conversion designations like Robert
Brace’s.225
C. The Government Should be Equitably Estopped from Prosecuting Robert
Brace for his 2012 Planting Activities.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is used to prevent a party from bringing
a claim against a second party who has already relied to its detriment on the first
party’s misrepresentations.226 To do so, the second party must establish that it relied
to its detriment on the first party’s misrepresentation and that its reliance was
reasonable because it did not know—nor should it have known—that the other party
was misrepresenting themselves.227 The majority of circuits allow the equitable
estoppel doctrine to be used against governments, but in such cases the claimant must
also establish “affirmative misconduct” by the government or its officials.228
Although only five circuits require the claimant to establish “affirmative
misconduct,” the Third Circuit is one of those five.229 In light of this background, the
traditional elements of equitable estoppel regarding government entities like the EPA
and the Corps include: (1) a misrepresentation by the government; (2) that constitutes
affirmative misconduct; and (3) was reasonably relied upon by the claimant.230

223. See generally MOA, supra note 152.
224. See id. at 8 (“[W]etland delineations made by [USDA-]SCS on agricultural lands, in consultation
with FWS, will be accepted by EPA and the Corps for the purposes of determining Section 404 wetland
jurisdiction.”).
225. See generally Kogan, supra note 97, at 23 (arguing that letting the agencies pick and choose like
this constitutes a denial of due process that violates the Administrative Procedure Act).
226. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty. v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1983), overruled
by Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
227. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984), quoting Wilber
National Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 124-125 (1935); United States v. Asmar, 827 F.2d 907,
912 (3d Cir. 1987). Other courts have held that several factors must be established, including (1) false
representation, (2) erroneous statement of fact, (3) factual ignorance on the part of the claimant, and (4)
adverse effects on the claimant as a result of the erroneous statements. See Estate of Emerson v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 612, 617-18, 1977 WL 3636 (1977). Courts are generally more likely to apply the
doctrine when the government conduct involves a misrepresentation of fact like the misrepresentation
made to Brace through the provision of an incorrect map of the Consent Decree property.
228. See Asmar, 827 F.2d at 911 n.4 (noting the additional burden on the claimant to show “affirmative
misconduct on the part of the government officials”); see also Califano, 698 F.2d at 622 (noting that
affirmative misconduct includes statements that “are so closely connected to the basic fairness of the
administrative decision making process that the government may be estopped from disavowing the
misstatement” and holding that affirmative misconduct existed where the government’s statements
induced the healthcare provider to submit reports that it otherwise would not have).
229. See Asmar, 827 F.2d at 911 n.4.
230. See Fredericks v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 126 F.3d 433, 450 (1997).
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The Third Circuit has stated that the government may be estopped if its
actions harm the public interest.231 In addition, the equitable estoppel doctrine has
been applied to many federal agencies, including, among others, the Post Office
Department (“Post Office”), United States Postal Service, Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Land Management Office, Farmer’s Home Administration,
and Department of Commerce and Labor.232 This wide exercise of the equitable
estoppel doctrine strongly suggests that applying it to other federal agencies—such
as the EPA and the Corps—should not be a problem.233
The Third Circuit has addressed the issue of equitable estoppel in the
context of governmental entities in Fredericks v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
where the IRS requested multiple extensions of the three-year statute of limitations
for assessing deficiencies after Barry Fredericks submitted his 1977 tax return.234
When those extensions expired, the IRS represented to Fredericks that it did not have
a Form 872-A, which extends the statute of limitations indefinitely.235 Fredericks
therefore concluded that the government lacked the ability to assess a deficiency on
his tax return.236 However, eight years after the expiration of the last extension, the
IRS informed Fredericks that he was liable for a deficiency of $28,361, plus
interest.237 Fredericks filed suit, arguing that the Commissioner was equitably
estopped (or barred) from relying on the previous extensions to avoid the statute of
limitations.238 After examining both the traditional and additional elements of the
estoppel doctrine, the Third Circuit held that Fredericks had proven the elements of
equitable estoppel.239 The court’s decision was largely based on the IRS’ repeated

231. See id., slip op. at 8; Califano, 698 F.2d at 622 (3d Cir. 1983), quoting Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.
53, 56-57 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that “[ . . . ] some forms of erroneous advice are so closely connected
to the basic fairness of the administrative decision making process that the government may be estopped
from disavowing the misstatement”) (emphasis added).
232. See, e.g., Dana Corp. v. United States, 470 F.2d 1032, 1046 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that the Post
Office Department was estopped from denying effects of agent’s decision to continue to pay and not
inform plaintiff-supplier that it was performing in excess of contract requirements); Manloading & Mgmt.
Assocs. V. United States, 461 F.2d 1299, 1303 (1972) (holding that Department of Housing and Urban
Development was estopped from denying renewal of contract with plaintiff where authorized agent had
assured prospective bidders that funds were available and contract would be renewed); Brandt v. Hickel,
427 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1970) (estopping Land Management Office from denying bidder priority where
agent gave erroneous advice that resubmitting proposal would not result in loss of priority); Portmann v.
United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1169 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that U.S. Postal Service may be estopped
from claiming packages were merchandise and from applying lower insurable limit if plaintiff could prove
that postal clerk assured her the packages could be insured as nonnegotiable documents up to a higher
limit); J. Homer Fritch, Inc. v. United States, 236 F. 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1996) (estopping Department of
Commerce and Labor from denying effect of extension of an option to charter a vessel where government
had requested said extension); Payne v. Block, 714 F.2d 1510, 1517-18 (11th Cir. 1983) (estopping
government from adhering to the previously established deadline because government agents failed to
notify potential applicants of loans).
233. See Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir. 1962).
234. See Fredericks v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 126 F.3d 433, 436 (1997).
235. Id. at 437.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 435, 450.
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and documented misrepresentations to Fredericks despite being the only party that
had all of the applicable information.240
In January 2017, the EPA reopened the 1990 Murphy tract case, alleging
that Brace had violated the 1996 consent decree by cleaning the ditches and planting
crops on the tract.241 The agency also charged Brace for violating the CWA on
another part of his property based on the same ditch-cleaning and planting actions.242
Brace had acted based on EPA and Corps officials’ July 2012 authorization to
conduct ditch maintenance and install drainage tile on certain parts of his property.243
This authorization was evidenced to Brace through an EPA-prepared Consent Decree
map that showed the portions of his land where he was authorized to conduct
drainage and repair activities.244
Relying on the Consent Decree map provided by the agency officials, Brace
conducted drainage maintenance on the two portions of land at issue in order to
prepare for planting.245 However, in the subsequent January 2017 lawsuits, the
government denied ever authorizing such actions.246 They disavowed the Consent
Decree map that they had initially provided to Brace and produced a second map of
the Consent Decree property that they had allegedly based their analysis on, a copy
of which had not been provided to Brace.247 These facts show that the government
intentionally misrepresented the facts to Brace and should be equitably estopped
from pursuing legal action against him for his 2012 activities.248
The elements of equitable estoppel are clearly fulfilled in Brace’s case.
First, the government made a misrepresentation to Brace by providing him with an
incorrect map that inaccurately portrayed the Consent Decree property.249 This action
constitutes a misrepresentation because the EPA provided Brace with incorrect
information that it could have corrected.250 In addition, Brace received written
documentation in the form of a map, rather than oral assurances, which helps him
survive the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Community Health
240. See id. at 446-47 (“Fredericks was not ‘merely . . . induced to do something which could be
corrected later.’ He was induced to forfeit his right to terminate the Form 872–A consent agreement. The
IRS’ subsequent action was not simply a correction of prior misrepresentations, it was a penalty
compounded daily as the IRS continued its 12–year investigation well beyond the statute of limitations
for any assessments. We conclude these are sufficient detriments to establish an estoppel defense.”)
(internal citations omitted); see generally Ritter v. United States, 28 F.2d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1928) (“The
acts or omissions of the officers of the government, if they authorized to bind the United States in a
particular transaction, will work estoppel against the government. . . . “).
241. See generally United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
242. See generally United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 1:17cv6 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
243. See Lutte Depo, supra note 141 (describing how Lutte and his colleagues made the field
determination for Brace’s planting activities but later informed him that their “determination was made in
error”).
244. See Response, supra note 3, Ex. 58 [Map 1].
245. See id. at 29, 58-59.
246. See Lutte Depo, supra note 141 (describing how Lutte and his colleagues made the field
determination for Brace’s planting activities but later informed him that their “determination was made in
error”).
247. See Response, supra note 3, Ex. 59 [Map 2].
248. See id. at 52.
249. See Response, supra note 3, Ex. 58 [Map 1].
250. See id. at Ex. 59 [Map 2].
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Services of Crawford County that individuals who receive only oral representations
from the government cannot invoke the estoppel doctrine.251
Second, this misrepresentation rises to the level of affirmative misconduct
because the government failed to respond to Brace’s repeated requests for
confirmation,252 failed to send Brace the proper map, and failed to inform Brace of
its mistake despite having that information and authority.253 This is exactly like the
circumstances in Fredericks, where the IRS failed to inform Fredericks of its mistake
despite being the only entity with all the relevant information and authority.254 This
also resembles Dana Corporation v. United States, where the Post Office was
estopped from avoiding liability for knowingly failing to inform a supplier who was
performing in excess of his contract.255 The Post Office knew the plaintiff was
incorrectly performing yet failed to inform him although it had the requisite
information and authority. 256 The Third Circuit has also determined that affirmative
misconduct in the context of misrepresentation includes statements that are central
to the decision-making process at issue.257 In the present case, the provision of the
Consent Decree map by the agency officials was central to the process of deciding
where Brace was authorized to plant.258
Third, Brace reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation.259 He
reasonably thought that the map he was provided with was accurate and acted based
on what the agencies communicated to him.260 Just as the IRS’ documentation of its
misrepresentations in Fredericks made Barry Fredericks’ reliance reasonable, the
agencies’ production of two different maps documenting the Consent Decree makes
Robert Brace’s reliance reasonable.261 Much like Community Health Services of
251. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 66 (1984).
252. See Response, supra note 3, at 32 (noting the agencies’ “repeated silence” in response to Brace’s
requests for confirmation).
253. See id. at 62 (“This Court must hold that the United States’ known cover-up of its Corps and EPA
representatives’ erroneous authorizations and such agencies’ subsequent intentional inducement of
Defendants to rely upon and accept Plaintiff’s legal position and to abandon any efforts to challenge it,
upon which defendants, in fact, relied until February 2017, to its economic and legal detriment, constitutes
affirmative government misconduct.”)
254. See Fredericks v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 126 F.3d 433, 446-47 (1997).
255. Id. (“Fredericks was not ‘merely . . . induced to do something which could be corrected later.’ He
was induced to forfeit his right to terminate the Form 872–A consent agreement. The IRS’ subsequent
action was not simply a correction of prior misrepresentations, it was a penalty compounded daily as the
IRS continued its 12–year investigation well beyond the statute of limitations for any assessments. We
conclude these are sufficient detriments to establish an estoppel defense.”) (internal citations omitted);
see also Dana Corp. v. United States, 470 F.2d 1032, 1046 (3d Cir. 1972).
256. Id.
257. See Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc. v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 622 (3d Cir. 1983)
(noting that affirmative misconduct includes statements that “are so closely connected to the basic fairness
of the administrative decision making process that the government may be estopped from disavowing the
misstatement” and holding that affirmative misconduct existed where the government’s statements
induced the healthcare provider to submit reports that it otherwise would not have).
258. See Response, supra note 3, Ex. 58 [Map 1].
259. See id. at 58-59.
260. See id. at 29 (“Brace, acting on behalf and under the direction of Defendants, reasonably
understood the scope of the authority they had received to conduct agricultural ditch maintenance on Elk
Creek and its tributaries and reaches south of Lane Road within the Consent Decree Area.”).
261. See Fredericks, 126 F.3d at 443.
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Crawford County in Califano relied in good faith upon the affirmative and incorrect
instructions from the Secretary of Human and Health Services,262 Brace relied in
good faith on the affirmative misrepresentations of the agency officials.263 The
agencies clearly had the authority to make such representations, which is important
because the Third Circuit has held that estoppel is appropriate where the government
agents have binding governmental authority in the matter.264 The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals should therefore invoke the equitable estoppel doctrine to prevent the
government from benefiting at Brace’s expense from its own acts of affirmative
misconduct upon which Brace relied.265
Robert Brace was falsely accused of violating the CWA.266 The Third
Circuit incorrectly characterized his pre-1985 activities on the Murphy tract as not
being normal farming activities.267 Furthermore, the agencies and the Third Circuit
incorrectly ignored Brace’s Commenced Conversion designation, denying him the
protection from CWA permitting requirements that he was due.268 Finally, the Third
Circuit should use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar the agencies from
pursuing legal action against Brace for his 2012 activities because the agencies made
misrepresentations to Brace that constitute affirmative misconduct upon which Brace
reasonably relied.269 Thus, in order to ensure that other farmers are not subjected to
circumstances like those of Robert Brace, Congress must make certain structural
changes.270

262. See Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc. v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 622 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ affirmative (HHS) and incorrect instructions
to Community Health Services of Crawford County (CHS) regarding the recouping of payments
constituted affirmative misconduct upon with CHS relied to its detriment and that HHS was estopped
from pursuing recoupment).
263. See Response, supra note 3, at 60 (“The United States knew Defendants would steadfastly rely
upon that authorization and interpret and execute it consistent with normal customary farming practices,
and Defendants did, in fact, so rely upon that authorization to their great financial, legal, emotional,
medical and reputational detriment.”).
264. See Ritter v. United States, 28 F.2d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1928) (“The acts or omissions of the officers
of the government, if they authorized to bind the United States in a particular transaction, will work
estoppel against the government. . . . “).
265. See Fredericks, 126 F.3d at 450.
266. See supra Part II (arguing that Brace was falsely accused of violating Federal statute and
regulations).
267. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Regardless of how typical or
necessary such drainage systems may be in Erie County, Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit for
‘activities which bring an area into farming . . . use,’ as opposed to activities that are part of an ‘established
farming operation.’”).
268. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 10 (“[O]n September 21, 1988, Erie County ASCS Executive
Director Joseph Burawa dispatched a letter correspondence to Defendant Robert Brace apprising him of
the Committee’s determination that his ‘conversion of wetlands began before December 23, 1985, and
[would] enable [him] to complete the conversion and produce an agricultural commodity on the converted
wetlands without losing USDA benefits.’”).
269. See Fredericks v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 126 F.3d 433, 450 (1997); see also Response,
supra note 3, Ex. 58 [Map 1]; see also Response, supra note 3, Ex. 59 [Map 2].
270. See supra Part III (arguing that Congress must address three policy issues in order to prevent
other farmers from experiencing the same struggles as Robert Brace).
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IV. RESTRUCTURING THE REGULATORY SYSTEM TO PROTECT
FAMILY FARMERS
The Robert Brace case exemplifies much of what is wrong with an
expansive administrative state.271 It provides a sobering reminder of the lack of
accountability that can stem from a broad grant of authority and raises serious
questions about the proper role of the government in overseeing private activities.272
The case also reveals the dangers associated with bureaucrats writing regulations for
a field in which they have no expertise.273 Agricultural and environmental interests
must both be taken into account, but regulatory frameworks divorced from the
realities of farming lead to unjustified harm to individuals like Robert Brace.274 The
case of Robert Brace displays the urgent need for redefinition of these ambiguous
statutes and regulations so that the rights of hard-working American farmers are not
disregarded.275
There are other farmers like Robert Brace, he is not the only farmer effected
by ambiguous statutes and regulations.276 As noted above, California farmer John
Duarte and Illinois farmer Kurt Wilke are two examples of others whose livelihood
has been hindered by these ambiguities. Congress should clarify this maze of
regulations so that the rights of other hard-working American farmers are not
disregarded.277 Congress must make three structural changes to the regulatory
framework in order to protect other farmers from circumstances like those of Robert

271. See Stewart, supra note 173, at 590 (“By regulating vital decisions about environmental risk
management through a remote, arcane, and piecemeal bureaucratic process, the command and control
system necessarily runs a serious democracy deficit.”).
272. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 172 (“When the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may
arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner. Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator.”); see also Higgins, supra note 173, at 307
(“[T]he CWA presents a stark illustration of how a seemingly limitless scope of authority can often lead
to an abuse of power.”).
273. See Bennett, supra note 1 (statement of Robert Brace) (“How in the hell do they know what
normal farming practices are, anyway? I’ve been in those fields since I was four years old. Guess what?
I’ve never done nothing except normal farming.”); see also Philadelphia Judges, supra note 125 (“I am
appalled that three judges who know nothing about forming have the ability to ruin my entire farming
operation, a farm which I have lived on and devoted 55 years of my life to, by interpreting a regulation
rather than abiding by the law established by our elected officials.”).
274. See Response, supra note 3, at 4 (“This action also demonstrates the lengths to which the United
States government will go . . . to secure a favorable legacy ruling and return on investment of millions of
dollars of U.S. taxpayer funds needlessly expended to prosecute an honest hardworking third-generation
Erie, Pennsylvania family farmer for following the law, relying on government advice and exercising his
constitutionally protected private property rights.”).
275. Cf. Porter, supra note 42 (“[T]he story of United States v. Robert Brace is a poignant reminder
that such regulation, whatever the supposed cost-benefit ratio, erodes freedom and undermines
independence.”).
276. See Arthur, supra note 155.
277. See Porter, supra note 42 (“[T]he story of United States v. Robert Brace is a poignant reminder
that such regulation, whatever the supposed cost-benefit ratio, erodes freedom and undermines
independence.”).
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Brace.278 First, Congress must redefine the CWA’s definition of “normal farming
activities” so that the regulation contains a realistic definition of agriculture.279
Second, Congress must reinforce the original definition of Prior Converted Cropland
to definitively exclude croplands converted prior to 1985 from CWA jurisdiction.280
Third, Congress and the agencies must reinstate the Commenced Conversion
designations of farmers like Robert Brace and allow them to complete those
conversions within three years.281 These proposed changes are the first few steps
toward appropriately restraining the administrative state and protecting America’s
farmers.282
A. Congress Must Redefine “Normal Farming Activities” Under the Clean
Water Act § 404 to Reflect a Realistic Understanding of What
Agriculture Involves
Even if the Third Circuit’s restrictive interpretation of normal farming
activities is justifiable through the statute’s wording, the Brace case clearly
demonstrates the need for a more realistic statutory definition of normal farming
activities.283 Under the statute, the definition of normal farming activities is based on
the chronological progression of agricultural uses, rather than the activities that are
normal for most farmers.284 This impractical definition is the reason behind the Third

278. See supra Part III (suggesting three policy changes for Congress to make in order to protect
farmers).
279. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2012) (noting that the current definition of normal
farming activities includes planting, seeding, harvesting, cultivation, minor drainage, upland soil and
water conservation practices, emergency repairs, maintaining drainage and tiling systems, and
maintaining drainage ditches); see also supra Part III.A (arguing that the CWA’s definition of “normal
farming activities” must be redefined in order for the regulation to have a realistic definition of
agriculture).
280. See supra Part III.A (arguing that Congress must reinforce the original definition of Prior
Converted cropland to definitively exclude croplands converted prior to 1985 from CWA jurisdiction);
see also Kogan, supra note 28 (“[F]ederal agencies have incrementally extended their control over
agricultural lands by expanding the definition of ‘waters of the US’ (WOTUS) under the Clean Water
Act (CWA) and asserting broad legal jurisdiction over WOTUS-adjacent ‘wetlands.’”).
281. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 10 (“[O]n September 21, 1988, Erie County ASCS Executive
Director Joseph Burawa dispatched a letter correspondence to Defendant Robert Brace apprising him of
the Committee’s determination that his ‘conversion of wetlands began before December 23, 1985, and
[would] enable [him] to complete the conversion and produce an agricultural commodity on the converted
wetlands without losing USDA benefits.’”); see also Kogan, supra note 97, at 20 (“The official
[Commenced Conversion] designation evidenced that Mr. Brace had . . . physically commenced and
committed substantial financial funds toward the conversion from pastured wetlands to croplands of
portions of two farm fields situated within two of three contiguous and adjacent farm tracts comprising
his 157-acre hydrologically integrated farm located in Waterford Township, PA. For these purposes,
permissible conversion activities included the excavating and dredging, clearing, leveling, draining and
filling, etc. of dikes and ditches in wetlands so as to impair or reduce the flow, circulation or reach of
water.”).
282. See Kogan, supra note 97, at 65.
283. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the regulations make it
clear that a farming operation should not be considered normal or ongoing where hydrological
modifications are necessary in order to resume farming).
284. See FEDERALIST SOCIETY, supra note 114.
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Circuit’s determination that Brace’s activities on the Murphy tract did not constitute
normal farming activity.285
Farming entails a myriad of activities, many of which are not row
cropping.286 Failing to recognize that hay production and pasturing animals
constitute the core of normal farming activities is contrary to reality.287 The USDA’s
National Agricultural Statistics Service determined that in 2016, American farmers
harvested 199,378 acres of hay.288 By comparison, in 2016, American farmers grew
213,934 acres of corn, which is widely considered one of the country’s most
commonly grown crops.289 Similarly, the 2012 Census of Agriculture showed that
45.4% of the total farmland in use that year was permanent pastureland while only
42.6% was cropland.290 These statistics show how unrealistic it was for the Third
Circuit to determine that Brace’s haying and pasturing activities on the Murphy tract
were not normal farming activities.291
In addition, the Third Circuit’s determination that Brace’s repairs to the
Murphy tract drainage system were not normal farming activities directly contradicts
the fact that installation and repair of drainage systems has been a regular part of
farmers’ lives for decades.292 The majority of tile drainage systems require
excavation to a depth of at least three feet, so it should come as no surprise to the
EPA and the Corps that Brace’s activities required some excavation.293 These
improper determinations by the Third Circuit as a result of the CWA § 404 definition
of “normal farming activities” reveal the urgent need to reconsider the definition of
normal farming activities.294
The original intent of the “normal farming activities” exemption was to
provide farmers with the freedom to conduct the full variety of their farming
activities without being hounded by regulations.295 During extensive debates
regarding the 1977 CWA amendments, statements by interested parties, bill
sponsors, senators, and others made this intent clear.296 For instance, National Farm
285. See Brace, 41 F.3d at 124 (holding that the district court’s ruling was irreconcilable with the
relevant regulations and was based on what it felt were irrelevant facts).
286. See Bennett, supra note 1 (“DOJ said a lack of row crops equated with a lack of farming.”).
287. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 138, at 11 (arguing that normal farming activities “are not
limited to growing only a particular row crop, but include other agricultural pursuits, such as pasturing
livestock and rotating crops, which farmers have undertaken for thousands of years”).
288. See Census, supra note 46 (showing that, in 2016, 213,934 acres of corn and 199,378 acres of
hay were harvested).
289. See id.
290. See Farms and Farmland, supra note 46 (noting that “[o]f the 915 million acres of land in farms
in 2012, 45.4 percent was permanent pasture [and] . . . 42.6 percent was cropland. . . . “).
291. See United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 Erie, 1, 8 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
292. See Matthews, supra note 81 (“Agricultural drainage tile has been used in crop fields for
centuries.”).
293. See Panuska, supra note 80, at 5 (noting that most tile drain installations require excavation to a
depth of between three and six feet).
294. See generally Bennett, supra note 1 (“DOJ said a lack of row crops equated with a lack of
farming.”).
295. See Hearings, supra note 35 (statement of Victor Veysey, Assistant Secretary of Army for Civil
Works) (noting that the intent behind normal farming activities was to ensure “that all the normal things
that a farmer does in the course of his operations are exempted. That was our intent”).
296. See id.
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Bureau’s Bruce Hawley stated that “normal farming activities” included things like
repairing drainage, laying new tiles, and managing water flow for farming
purposes.297 Hawley’s statement reflected farmers’ widespread use of tile drainage
systems since at least the 1830s and validated the fact that repairs to drainage systems
are a normal part of farming.298 Other statements reflected the ubiquitous fear of
overregulation that would fail to account for the realities of everyday farming
activities.299 For example, West Virginia Senator Jennings Randolph noted the
“widespread concern that many activities that are normally considered routine would
be prohibited or made extremely difficult because of the complex regulatory
procedures.”300 Congress recognized the unreasonableness of imposing restrictive
burdens on common farming activities across the country and created the § 404
“normal farming activities” exemption to avoid such a burden.301 Over time,
however, the agencies tasked with overseeing this definition have warped and
misinterpreted it. This has led to a tremendous expansion of their power.302
Therefore, Congress must redefine and reinforce the definition of “normal farming
activities” under CWA § 404 in the following ways to protect farmers from
unreasonable interpretations of the statute.303
First, Congress must reinforce the fact that compliance with this provision
is a fact-specific, contextual inquiry.304 The District Court acted correctly when it
examined Brace’s activities in light of usual farming practices in Erie County,
Brace’s Commenced Conversion designation, and the entirety of his property.305 The
Third Circuit looked only at the Murphy tract to determine whether there was a
normal and ongoing farming operation.306 The circuit court did so because it felt that
the failure of the regulations to specify the precise area the court should look at
implied that it should only look at the Murphy tract.307 However, United States v.
297. Id. (statement of Bruce Hawley, Assistant Director, National Affairs, National Farm Bureau)
([“N]ormal farming activity also includes such things as streambank protection, drainage ditches,
construction of new drainage ditches, a laying of new tiles, impounding of waters for the express purpose
of having something for livestock to drink later in the summer, and so on.”).
298. See Northwestern, supra note 74, at 136.
299. See Hearings, supra note 35 (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph, W. Va.).
300. See id.
301. See Porter, supra note 42 (stating that Senator Edmund Muskie felt that the permitting
requirements of the CWA had become “synonymous with federal overregulation, overcontrol,
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, and a general lack of realism”).
302. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 138 at 10 (“[T]he EPA and the Corps, along with a number
of federal courts which have visited the matter, have given the exception a crabbed and unduly narrow
interpretation which has vitiated the exemption’s usefulness to farmers and ranchers.”).
303. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2012) (noting that the current definition of normal
farming activities includes planting, seeding, harvesting, cultivation, minor drainage, upland soil and
water conservation practices, emergency repairs, maintaining drainage and tiling systems, and
maintaining drainage ditches).
304. See United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 Erie, 1, 8 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (“Extensive
underground drainage systems are typical and necessary aspects of farming in Erie County, and the
installation of such systems is a normal farming activity in order to make land suitable for farming.”).
305. See id.; see also United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1175 (D. Mass. 1986).
306. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1994).
307. See id. (“The regulations do not specify the precise area to which we should look in determining
whether there is an established farming operation.”).
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Cumberland Farms, the only precedent used by the Third Circuit to support its
decision, is inconclusive as to whether courts should look at the specific parcel at
issue or the entire property.308
Second, Congress must redefine the “normal farming activities” exemption
to explicitly include pasturing and hay production.309 The Third Circuit’s definition
of “normal farming activities” is simply out of touch with reality.310 America’s
farmers have been producing hay and grazing animals on their farms for decades.311
The original intent of the exemption was to provide farmers with the freedom to
conduct the full variety of farming activities without oppressive regulatory
pressure.312 The formation of this exemption reflected the widespread concern that
“many [farming] activities that are normally considered routine would be prohibited
or made extremely difficult because of the complex regulatory procedures.”313
Congress should realign the definition and application of the “normal farming
activities” exemption with both a realistic view of farming and with the true purpose
of the exemption.314 Congress can do so simply by recognizing that pasturing and
hay production fall under one of the currently exempted activities, such as cultivation
or harvesting.315
Third, Congress must either redefine “normal farming activities” to include
the construction and repair of tile drainage systems or explicitly include the
construction and repair of tile drainage systems within one of the currently exempted
activities.316 Farmers in the United States have used tile drainage systems since the
early 1800s, and they are a part of almost every farmer’s operation.317 Like any other
farming implement, tile drainage systems may need occasional maintenance.318
308. See Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1175 (referring ambiguously to “the site”).
309. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2012) (describing normal farming as “plowing, seeding,
cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland
soil and water conservation practices. . . . “).
310. See generally Census, supra note 46 (showing that, in 2016, 213,934 acres of corn and 199,378
acres of hay were harvested); see generally Farms and Farmland, supra note 46 (noting that “[o]f the 915
million acres of land in farms in 2012, 45.4 percent was permanent pasture [and] . . . 42.6 percent was
cropland. . . . “); see generally Bennett, supra note 1 (“DOJ said a lack of row crops equated with a lack
of farming.”).
311. See Census, supra note 46 (showing that, in 2016, 213,934 acres of corn and 199,378 acres of
hay were harvested); see also Farms and Farmland, supra note 46 (noting that “[o]f the 915 million acres
of land in farms in 2012, 45.4 percent was permanent pasture [and] . . . 42.6 percent was cropland. . . . “).
312. See Hearings, supra note 35 (statement of Victor Veysey, Assistant Secretary of Army for Civil
Works) (“[A]ll the normal things that a farmer does in the course of his operations are exempted. That
was our intent”).
313. See id. (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph, W. Va.).
314. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2012) (describing normal farming as “plowing, seeding,
cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland
soil and water conservation practices. . . . “).
315. See id. (stating cultivating and harvesting are normal farming activities).
316. See generally United States v. Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229 Erie, 1, 6-7 (W.D. Pa. 1993)
(describing the various repair, excavation, and construction activities Brace undertook).
317. See Northwestern, supra note 74, at 136-37.
318. See Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229, at 3 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (“Extensive underground drainage
systems are typical and necessary aspects of farming in Erie County, and the installation of such systems
is a normal farming activity in order to make land suitable for farming.”); see also Northwestern, supra
note 74, at 137.
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Periodic additions and repairs to tile drainage systems are a regular task for farmers
who utilize such systems.319 The current statute includes the construction or
maintenance of irrigation ditches and the maintenance of drainage ditches, both of
which could reasonably include the construction and repair of drainage tile
systems.320 Therefore, Congress must recognize that maintenance of tile drainage
systems reasonably includes repairing old, existing drainage tiles and that such
repairs reasonably include construction efforts.321
Finally, Congress must clarify the Recapture Provision because it unduly
burdens farmers’ ability to earn a living.322 The current provision, which requires a
permit for any activity that brings a navigable water into a “new” use, is open to a
wide variety of interpretations.323 This provision contradicts the initial purpose of §
404 and ignores the fact that in order to comply farmers must constantly modify
hydrological conditions to have a chance of growing crops.324 Therefore, Congress
should make it clear that this provision is only concerned with whether the water in
question was used for any agricultural purpose in the past.325 In other words, an
activity should only fall under the Recapture Provision if it brings a navigable water
into an agricultural use when that navigable water has never been used for
agriculture.326 Thus, a farmer who grows crops on land that was previously used for

319. FARMERS BULLETIN, supra note 81, at 10 (“Where it is possible to install a whole drainage system
on a farm at one time it is by all means advisable. In actual practice, however, such a condition seldom
occurs. Not many farmers have the money, Time, or labor to do it all within a short period, or even within
a year. Therefore most of the tile-drainage work must be done as it has been done in the past, a part at a
time, until it is all accomplished. This means that the farmers should first drain those parts of his farm that
need it most sport on which the profits will be the greatest. . . . “).
320. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(C) (2012) (stating that the current definition of normal farming activities
includes maintenance of drainage ditches and the construction or maintenance of irrigation ditches).
321. See generally Brace, Civil Action No. 90-229, at 6-7 (describing the various repair, excavation,
and construction activities Brace undertook); see generally Matthews, supra note 81 (explaining that
“agricultural drainage tile has been used in crop fields for centuries”); see generally Panuska, supra note
80, at 5 (noting that most tile drain installations require excavation to a depth of between three and six
feet).
322. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (2012) (“Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters
into a use to which it was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may
be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required to have a permit under this section.”)
323. See United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a farmer who tilled
wetlands that had not produced crops on a regular basis did not fall under the normal farming activities
exemption); see also United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (holding that the
landowners were not entitled to the exemption to the permit requirement because their actions were meant
to bring the wetlands into cultivation, a use to which the land was not previously subject).
324. See Panuska, supra note 80, at 5 (noting that most tile drain installations require excavation to a
depth of between three and six feet).
325. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (2012) (“Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters
into a use to which it was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may
be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required to have a permit under this section.”).
326. See id.; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 138, at 12 (arguing that “the recapture
provision . . . does not come into play were a farmer merely alters the mix of agricultural uses of his land.
Rather it applies where landowners categorically change the use of their land, such as from a farm to a
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grazing animals or producing hay should not be subject to the Recapture Provision
even if there was a lapse in time between the two agricultural uses.
These changes will not give farmers free reign to skirt the permitting
requirements of the CWA.327 The legal precedent on the topic makes it clear that the
courts have consistently construed the § 404 exemptions quite narrowly.328 For
example, the court in Akers held that a farmer who tilled wetlands that had not
produced crops on a regular basis did not fall under the normal farming activities
exemption.329 Similarly, the court in Avolleyes held that where no farming operation
could have existed until long after the activities at issue had completely changed the
use of the land, such activities were not “normal farming activities.” 330 In other
words, the court determined that after the farming operations changed to the point
that they were unrecognizable in comparison to the original farming activities, they
would not be considered “normal farming activities.” Thus, the CWA permitting
requirements will still be in place and will still apply to all landowners, including
farmers.331 These proposed changes will simply ensure that the regulation is working
with a realistic definition of agriculture and that it aligns with Congress’ intent for
the “normal farming activities” exemption.332
B. Congress Must Reinforce the Original Definition of Prior Converted
Cropland to Definitively Exclude Croplands Converted Prior to 1985
from CWA Jurisdiction
The agencies disregarded Brace’s Commenced Conversion designation and
the Prior Converted status it effectively provided him.333 The agencies’ actions were
possible primarily because of the definition of Prior Converted Cropland.334 This
definition requires that the land show no wetland features in order to be considered

residential development.”); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 925-26 (5th Cir.
1983) (holding that where no farming operation could have existed until long after the activities at issue
completely changed the use of the land, the activities were not normal farming activities).
327. See Perdion, supra note 70, at 868 (“The agricultural industry poses one of the greatest threats to
our country’s wetlands.”).
328. Pufko, supra note 31, at 240 (noting that the permit exemption of § 404(f)(1) has been interpreted
narrowly).
329. United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a farmer who tilled
wetlands that had not produced crops on a regular basis did not fall under the normal farming activities
exemption).
330. See 715 F.2d 925-26 (5th Cir. 1983).
331. See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
332. See Porter, supra note 42 (stating that Senator Edmund Muskie felt that the permitting
requirements of the CWA had become “synonymous with federal overregulation, overcontrol,
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, and a general lack of realism”).
333. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 10 (“[O]n September 21, 1988, Erie County ASCS Executive
Director Joseph Burawa dispatched a letter correspondence to Defendant Robert Brace apprising him of
the Committee’s determination that his ‘conversion of wetlands began before December 23, 1985, and
[would] enable [him] to complete the conversion and produce an agricultural commodity on the converted
wetlands without losing USDA benefits.’”).
334. Manual, supra note 59, § 514.30 (describing the conditions for PC status).
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Prior Converted Cropland.335 Therefore, the agencies only had to prove that Brace’s
land had some wetland features to ensure Prior Converted status was not given.336
This series of events is a perfect example of the ambiguity and potential overenforcement inherent in the definition of Prior Converted Cropland.
Overshadowing these difficulties is the fact that the CWA does not say
anything about wetlands; only the regulations that accompany the CWA mention
wetlands.337 Because these provisions are not in the statute, the government does not
have to prove that the wetland was actually harmed.338 Instead, the government only
has to check the boxes necessary for the land to fall under the regulation.339 This
process creates a significant level of ambiguity that puts farmers at a disadvantage
when trying to defend themselves against agency action.340
In order to remedy this problem, Congress must reinforce the 1993 Joint
Regulation between the Corps and the EPA that excluded Prior Converted Cropland
from the definition of WOTUS.341 The Joint Regulation did so in order to achieve
consistency among the various federal programs that address wetlands.342 It
recognized that Prior Converted Cropland no longer exhibited characteristics or
functions of wetlands and therefore should not be treated as such under the CWA.343
Reinforcement of this standard by Congress would eliminate the possibility of
ambiguous over-enforcement and enable farmers to know exactly when they may be
subject to regulation.344 The Trump administration’s revision of the WOTUS
definition, which excludes Prior Converted Cropland from the definition of WOTUS,
is a step in the right direction. 345 Reinforcing the Joint Regulation in this way will
not lead to the widespread degradation of wetlands.346 The cumulative effect of the
CWA and other statutes will continue to protect wetlands.347 This proposal will

335. See Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,031 (“[W]e are excluding PC crop land from the definition of the
waters of U.S. in order to achieve consistency in the manner in which various federal programs address
wetlands.”).
336. See id.
337. See McBeth, supra note 52, at 226 (noting that the FSA was the first federal statute to explicitly
use the term “wetland”).
338. See Interview, supra note 72.
339. See Manual, supra note 59, at Sec. 514.30(a) (explaining the conditions for PC status).
340. See Interview, supra note 72; see also Bennett, supra note 1 (statement of Congressman Glenn
Thompson) (“Bob’s case demonstrates the serious problems landowners face regarding ambiguity of
wetlands designations. We need to get rid of ambiguity. Ambiguity gives bureaucrats more room to
maneuver.”).
341. See Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008 (“[W]e are excluding PC cropland from the definition of the
waters of U.S. in order to achieve consistency in the manner in which various federal programs address
wetlands.”).
342. See id.
343. See id. at 26 (“PC cropland no longer performs the functions or has values that the area did in its
natural condition.”).
344. See Smith, supra note 29, at 340 (arguing that the significant nexus standard leads to disparate
outcomes and uncertainty for private property owners).
345. See generally Revised Definition, 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154; see generally New Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,
251.
346. See Perdion, supra note 70, at 868.
347. See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
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simply ensure that the individual laws are not unduly oppressive to farmers like
Robert Brace.
C. Congress Must Recognize the Valid Commenced Conversion Designations
of Robert Brace and Others and Allow Them Three Years to Complete
the Conversions
In addition to the changes proposed above, Congress must recognize the
valid Commenced Conversion designations of farmers like Robert Brace and allow
those individuals three years to complete the conversions.348 This recognition will
give farmers like Robert Brace the protection from CWA regulation that they are
entitled349 because a Commenced Conversion designation effectively provides the
farmer with Prior Converted status by signaling that the conversion effort was begun
before December 23, 1985.350 The three-year timeframe will provide the appropriate
amount of time for Brace and others like him to complete their conversions.351
The case of Robert Brace is a perfect example of the need for recognition
of Commenced Conversion designations.352 Brace has presented strong evidence of
continued work on the conversion effort and has documentation that the conversion
commenced before December 23, 1985.353 He failed to finish the conversion effort
only because of recurring beaver activity, the government’s intrusion, and the faulty
Restoration Plan, all of which were completely out of his control.354
Under the statute, Commenced Conversions were required to be completed
by January 1, 1995.355 However, some precedent suggests that a tolling of the time
limitation on Commenced Conversions would be acceptable in certain

348. See generally Motion for Relief, supra note 78, at 14 (“Defendants respectfully request that this
Court exercise its equitable powers to recognize the extraordinary circumstances that justify allowing
Defendants to prospectively continue and complete, by no later than three (3) years from the entry of
judgment, the prior commenced conversion of their Murphy Farm tract previously authorized by the
United States Department of Agriculture.”).
349. See Kogan, supra note 14, at 65 (“[T]he President must both work with Congress . . . to reclaim,
reestablish and reaffirm for all of America’s farmers, especially Mr. Brace, their former [Prior Converted]
and [Commenced Conversion] exclusions from FSA funding ineligibility and CWA Section 404 wetlands
jurisdiction.”).
350. See Manual, supra note 59, at Sec. 514.30 (“Wetlands that have been given a commenced
conversion determination are considered prior conversions when the commenced activities are completed
and the area meets the criteria for prior converted croplands.”).
351. See Interview, supra note 72.
352. See Bennett, supra note 1 (“Brace was sealed in a CWA box, and no matter which way he turned,
he wasn’t allowed to use the Food and Security Act of 1985 to say his farmland activity was protected
from CWA jurisdiction.”).
353. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 57 (stating that Brace worked “on a continuous and regular
basis in these areas in 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986 and 1987”).
354. See Report, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that agency interference was actually one of the primary
causes of the creation of wetland conditions because they did not allow him to maintain the ditches); see
also Motion to Vacate, supra note 124, at 3.
355. See 7 CFR § 12.5(b)(2)(iii) (2015) (requiring conversion efforts to be completed before January
1, 1995).
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circumstances.356 One such circumstance, described in Lyng which could lead to the
tolling of a Commenced Conversion designation is an arbitrary, capricious, or
unlawful government action.357 The government action in this case can arguably be
classified as arbitrary and capricious.358 For instance, the government’s
implementation of the EPA’s Restoration Plan made it impossible for Brace to farm
not only the Murphy tract but also other parts of his land.359 In addition, the
Restoration Plan forced Brace to create an artificial wetland that did not originally
exist.360 Furthermore, the government’ disregarded Brace’s valid Commenced
Conversion designation without a warrant.361 In light of Lyng, these facts strongly
suggest that the government action in this case was arbitrary and capricious.362
Therefore, Brace should have an opportunity to complete his conversion effort
without further government interference.363 Tolling the time limitation on
Commenced Conversions for three years would provide Brace and others like him
with adequate opportunity to complete their conversion efforts.
Based on these facts, Robert Brace was wrongfully accused of violating the
CWA and FSA.364 To ensure that other farmers are not subjected to such a fate,
several structural changes must be made to the United States’ environmental and
agricultural regulatory systems.365 These changes include redefining the normal
farming activities exemption under the CWA to reflect a more realistic

356. See Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986) (stating that equitable tolling principles
applied to administrative appeals); Von Eye v. United States, 92 F.3d 681, 684 (8th Cir. 1996), (holding
that, under certain circumstances, “the time limitation in 12.5(b)(5)(iii) could be equitably tolled”).
357. See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 936 (1986) (“If, for example, a farmer had filed a loan
application prior to the expiration of the loan deadline and a court determined that the denial of the
application after the deadline’s expiration was arbitrary, capricious and not in accordance with law, the
appropriate remedy under the APA would be to direct that the application be granted or reconsidered.”).
358. See Memorandum, supra note 58, at 57 (noting that the Murphy tract should have been excluded
“from CWA Section 404 jurisdiction pending Defendants’ completion of the conversion pre-January 1,
1995, but for circumstances beyond Defendants’ control–i.e., the Government’s intentional disruption,
thwarting and nullification of such effort”); see also Kogan, supra note 97, at 21-22 (“The evidence todate reveals, however, that EPA and the Corps, led by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (‘FWS’)
Pennsylvania Field Office (within Region 5), intentionally interfered with, actively contested on
‘relevance grounds,’ and then disregarded the Erie County USDA-ASCS Committee’s CC determination
for portions of the two prior commenced-converted Brace farm fields in question.”).
359. See Motion to Vacate, supra note 124, at 3-4 (describing how the government’s arbitrary
implementation of the EPA’s Restoration Plan makes it impossible for Brace to complete the conversion
and farm much of his own land, even land outside the area of the consent decree).
360. See Responsive Statement, supra note 127 (noting that the site “did not historically constitute a
‘wetland,’ did not previously constitute a wetland in 2012-2013, and currently does not constitute a
‘wetland’”).
361. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he district court erred in relying
upon a determination from the ASCS in September of 1988 that Brace had ‘commenced conversion’ of
his property from wetland to cropland prior to December 23, 1985, as evidence of an ‘established farming
operation’ at the site.”).
362. See Lyng, 476 U.S. at 936.
363. See generally id.; Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986) (stating that equitable tolling
principles applied to administrative appeals); Von Eye v. United States, 92 F.3d 681, 684 (8th Cir. 1996).
364. See Brace, 41 F.3d at 127.
365. See supra Part IV (suggesting three policy changes for Congress to make in order to protect
farmers).
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understanding of agriculture, reinforcing the original definition of Prior Converted
Cropland to definitively exclude croplands converted prior to 1985 from CWA
jurisdiction, and definitively recognizing the Commenced Conversion exemptions
from CWA regulation given to farmers like Robert Brace.366
V. CONCLUSION
The Robert Brace case is a sobering reminder of the dangers of an
unchecked administrative state.367 These foundational concepts of governance are
threatened by administrative agencies, which utilize all three powers of government
tend to unduly burden the freedoms of American citizens when they act without
proper restraint.
Robert Brace was wrongfully accused of violating the CWA and FSA.368
First, Brace’s pre-1985 activities on the Murphy tract were incorrectly characterized
as not being normal farming activities. Second, the agencies incorrectly ignored
Brace’s Commenced Conversion designation, effectively denying him the protection
from CWA permitting requirements that he was rightfully due. Third, the Third
Circuit should use the equitable estoppel doctrine to bar the agencies from pursuing
legal action against Brace for his 2012 activities, which do not constitute violations
of either the consent decree or the CWA.
In order to ensure that other farmers are not subjected to circumstances like
those of Robert Brace, Congress must revise the statutory and regulatory framework
so that it contains a realistic understanding of farming practices.369 First, the CWA’s
definition of “normal farming activities” must be redefined to reflect the original
intent of the drafters of the normal farming activities exemption, which was to enable
farmers to freely conduct their farming operations without being unduly burdened
by regulations.370 Second, Congress must reinforce the original definition of Prior
Converted Cropland to definitively exclude croplands converted prior to 1985 from
CWA jurisdiction. Third, Congress and the relevant agencies should recognize the

366. See Brace, 41 F.3d at 124 (holding that the district court’s ruling was irreconcilable with the
relevant regulations and was based on what it felt were irrelevant facts); cf. Census, supra note 46
(showing that in 2016, 213,934 acres of corn and 199,378 acres of hay were harvested); cf. Farms and
Farmland, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that “[o]f the 915 million acres of land in farms in 2012, 45.4 percent
was . . . pasture [and] . . . 42.6 percent was cropland. . . . “); see also Kogan, supra note 28 (“[F]ederal
agencies have incrementally extended their control over agricultural lands by expanding . . . the Clean
Water Act (CWA) and asserting broad legal jurisdiction over WOTUS-adjacent ‘wetlands.’”).
367. Cf. Stewart, supra note 173, at 590 (“By regulating vital decisions about environmental risk
management through a remote, arcane, and piecemeal bureaucratic process, the command and control
system necessarily runs a serious democracy deficit.”); see also Bennett, supra note 1 (statement of
Congressman Glenn Thompson) (“Bob’s case demonstrates the serious problems landowners face
regarding ambiguity of wetlands designations. We need to get rid of ambiguity. Ambiguity gives
bureaucrats more room to maneuver.”).
368. Cf. Brace, 41 F.3d at 127 (arguing that the charges against Brace are unwarranted on multiple
grounds).
369. See Porter, supra note 42 (showing how Congress’s extensive and unrealistic regulation regime
undermine a farmer’s freedom). “[T]he story of United States v. Robert Brace is a poignant reminder that
such regulation, whatever the supposed cost-benefit ratio, erodes freedom and undermines independence.”
370. See supra Part II.
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Commenced Conversion designations of farmers like Robert Brace and allow them
to complete those conversions within three years.
The quality of the environment, including wetlands, is critically important.
Protecting farmers and ranchers is also a worthy cause. National and local actors
must balance these two interests, but it cannot be through an ever-expanding
administrative state. Allowing unelected administrative agencies to regulate
industries that they may or may not have a complete understanding of is a step in the
wrong direction.371 The unfortunate story of Robert Brace shows that the shifting
sands of the administrative state can pose a grave threat to individual freedoms if
allowed to roam unchecked.372 The government’s mistreatment of Robert Brace,
although he followed the law and reasonably relied on government authorization,
calls into question the administrative state’s definition of justice.373
These proposed changes may not entirely solve the problem, but they will at least
begin to appropriately restrain the administrative state and protect the individual
freedoms of America’s farmers.374

371. See Bennett, supra note 1 (statement of Robert Brace) (“We’re at the point where people who
have never farmed in their lives or set foot outside an office building get to define normal farming.”).
372. See Response, supra note 3, at 4 (“The United States . . . has employed a ‘win at any cost’ ‘ends
justifies means’ approach to governance that poses a grave threat to the administration of justice.”).
373. See id. (“This action also demonstrates the lengths to which the United States government will
go . . . to secure a favorable legacy ruling and return on investment of millions of dollars of U.S. taxpayer
funds needlessly expended to prosecute an honest hardworking third-generation Erie, Pennsylvania family
farmer for following the law, relying on government advice and exercising his constitutionally protected
private property rights.”).
374. See Kogan, supra note 14, at 65.

